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September 30, 2018:  
 
“Yet another glass ceiling1 is shattered, and women will finally have a seat at the table in corporate 
board rooms. Corporations will be more profitable. This is a giant step forward for women, our 
businesses and our economy”  
- California Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson,  
Scripps College Alumna ’71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 A glass ceiling is "the unseen, yet unbreachable barrier that keeps minorities and women from rising to the upper 
rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or achievements” (Witt, 1995, para. 3). 
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ABSTRACT 
On September 30, 2018, California Senate Bill 826 (CA SB 826) was passed. This Bill 
requires a quota for women to serve on California headquartered and public corporate boards. 
This study focuses on California tech firms, which I define as firms that are reliant on technology 
to create their main product or platform; but, are not aerospace or telecommunication firms. My 
thesis is a two-part analysis: exploring employees’, who worked at companies that were 
impacted by this Bill, perspectives, as well as, discovering if there is a relationship between 
percentage of female directors and stock price performance. Most employees were familiar with 
the Bill and believed that their companies would comply with it. Yet, they did not believe the 
fine was an incentivizing factor and agreed that a Bill focusing on Chief Suites (C-Suites) could 
be more effective in increasing company gender-diversity (Interview Hypotheses 1, 3, 4). 
Additionally, there were no statistically significant relationships and weak correlations between 
female directors and stock prices. There were also no statistically significant relationships 
between percentage change of female directors and percentage change of stock prices (Empirical 
Analysis Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4; Dataset 2, 3, 4). Ultimately, my research implies that while 
California tech companies are likely to comply with the Bill, adding more women onto boards 
will not have an impact on market performance on California tech firms. This research gives 
insight into the results other states might have through implementing similar laws. It can also 
advise them to refine their legislation to align with international policies and recommend that 
they consider enacting a similar Bill focusing on C-Suite gender diversity. 
 
Keywords: gender diversity, gender equity, women on boards, women in leadership, legislation, 
tech companies 
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INTRODUCTION 
Diversity in the workplace2 is valued by employers and employees. In fact, it was one of 
the key workplace trends in 2018 and 2019. Companies with high diversity benefit from less bias 
in product and services, where male experiences are taken as the ‘norm.’ They also benefit as 
they have better ‘organizational governance and social responsibility’ and better ‘occupational 
well-being’ for men and women (Fine et al., 2020, p. 42, 43). While companies tend to value 
diversity, when they attempt to increase diversity in their workplace, they are faced with barriers. 
This could be because a part of the company tends to value a lack of diversity, as more diverse 
workplaces can be challenging to navigate.  
Increasing diversity in the workplace requires companies to recognize the value of 
differences, combat discrimination, and promote inclusiveness (Green et al., 2019). Additionally, 
it requires employees to be supportive of change. Often times diversity can be equated with 
affirmative action, which are “positive steps taken to increase the representation of women 
and minorities in areas of employment, education, and culture from which they have been 
historically excluded” (Unknown, 2018). Yet, affirmative action has a history of racial 
assumptions leading people to believe that minorities were hired simply because they match a 
certain quota. This is supported by a 1995 poll conducted by USA Today, CNN, and Gallup. 
They found that 19% of surveyed black women to believe that their colleagues ‘privately 
questioned… [their] abilities or qualifications’ (Von Bergen et al., 2002, p. 242). With an 
increase of minorities in the workforce, white males can feel threatened. Ultimately, causing 
them to think that they will “lose out on hiring and promotions to less qualified workers,” and 
 
2
 Diversity in the workplace while not limited to, is most commonly referred to as racial, ethnic, and gender 
diversity. 
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then receive the mythological effects of reverse discrimination3 (Von Bergen et al., 2002, p. 
243). 
These barriers prevent companies from diversifying their workplace and inhibit minority 
applicants to receive positions in organizations. The barriers ultimately exist to uphold the glass 
ceiling barrier, which is "the unseen, yet unbreachable barrier that keeps minorities and women 
from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or 
achievements” (Witt, 1995, para. 3). This ceiling enables women and minorities to face more 
discrimination in the hiring process than men (Fernandez & Rubineau, 2019; Ignatova, 2019; 
Karimi et al., 2018; Gerdeman, 2017; Van Vianen & Willemsen, 1992). It is supported through 
powers of homophily and stereotyping.  
Homophily suggests that people are more likely to connect with those similar in 
“characteristics like age, race, gender, and income and stereotyping” (Byrne, 2018, para. 1). 
Homophily acts as a barrier as companies attract others that are similar to them (Rivera, 2012). 
Stereotyping can also occur if companies have preconceived notions of a future employee, and 
therefore do not select them because of these notions (Gonzalez et al., 2019).  
Since 2009, the number of women in the workforce has increased from 43.2% to 58.2.% 
in 2018 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018). From 2008 to 2017, female 
directorships, or female directors, board chairs, and CEOs, has increased from 13% to 19% 
within S&P 1500 companies. Yet, this increase is not represented in companies’ corporate 
boards, specifically. Between 2008 to 2017, the percentage of female directors increased from 
8% to only 10% (Papadopoulos et al., 2018). In fact, if women continue to join corporate boards 
at the current rate, it could take more than 48 years to achieve full gender parity. Furthermore, if 
 
3 Reverse discrimination is when people in majority groups believe that minorities will ‘gain benefits at the expense 
of whites who apart from race, would have had a superior claim to enjoy them’ (Newkirk, 2017, para. 6). 
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companies attempted to fill every open board seat with a woman director, gender parity would 
not be reached until 2024 (Bellstrom, 2016). 
An Overview of California Senate Bill 826 
According to Barrett (2019), “only 15.5% of California company board seats are held by 
women and 16.2% of board seats in the Russell 3000—a ‘capitalization-weighted stock 
market index,’—are held by women” (p.3; Unknown, 2019, para. 1). In addition, most California 
companies do not have two or more female directors (Barrett, 2019). This lack of representation 
led California Governor Jerry Brown and Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson (Scripps College 
Alumna ’71) to enact California Senate Bill 826 (CA SB 826) on September 30, 2018 (CA SB 
826, 2018; Scripps College, 2018). CA SB 826 requires public and headquartered California 
companies to add more women on their corporate boards. The purpose of the Bill is to, “boost 
the California economy, improve opportunities for women in the workplace, and protect 
California taxpayers, shareholders, and retirees” (CA SB 826, Section 1, A). 
Companies were given three years and three months to completely comply with the Bill’s 
requirements. Since its enactment, over 1.5 years have passed. During these months, the 
Secretary of State, Alex Padilla, posted two update reports on July 1, 2019 and March 1, 2020. 
These give insight to the changes that companies have made. Therefore, this thesis is written at 
an ideal time—at approximately at the half-way point before companies need to comply with the 
Bill and before violations will be further enforced, and after two update reports have been 
published. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Diversity in the Workplace 
Companies that have high diversity also have higher company performance and higher 
revenue due to innovation (Lorenzo et al., 2018). This positive impact is reflected beyond 
revenue as diverse companies are more likely to “attract top talent, improve their customer 
orientation, employee satisfaction, and decision making” (Hunt et al., 2018, para. 16). Diversity 
is not only important to companies’ top line growth but is also significant to their employees. In 
fact, 67% of job seekers said a diverse workforce was important when considering job offers 
(Glassdoor, 2014). As diversity is becoming increasingly valued by employees, especially 
Millennial and Gen Z Generations, websites like Great Place to Work and Diversity Inc. have 
been created so prospective employees can measure an organization’s inclusivity (Smith & 
Turner, 2015). 
Gender Diversity in the Workplace 
As more women enter the workforce, increasing from 32.7%, in 1948, to 56.8%, in 2016, 
there has been a surge of research on the positive impacts of gender diversity on companies 
(DeWolf, 2017). This is best demonstrated through examples of McKinsey & Company’s 
Women in the Workplace, Credit Suisse’s Gender 3000, and Deloitte’s Women in the Boardroom 
reports. Through their research, they have found that most gender-diverse companies are 21% 
more likely to experience above-average profitability; therefore, outperforming their peers. They 
also are 27% more likely to have “superior value creation” (Hunt et al., 2018, p.1). Furthermore, 
organizations where women hold at least 30% of leadership roles are “1.4 times more likely to 
have sustained, profitable growth.” Their leaders are twice as likely to work together to create 
new solutions and opportunities, 1.5 times more likely to work cross functionally, and 1.7 times 
more likely to have strong leadership (Dishman, 2020, para. 2 and 3). An increase of women in 
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companies also leads to a better understanding of female consumers’ desires and needs. After 
PepsiCo Inc. increased the percentage of women and ethnic minorities, throughout the company, 
“about 1% of the company’s revenue growth came from products inspired by diversity efforts” 
(Bauer & Erdogan, 2015).  
Better firm performance is clearly tied to diversity, so why are more not firms 
diversifying? Aubrey Blanche (2018), head of Diversity and Inclusion (D&I) at Atlassian,4 
believes excuses for not increasing workplace diversity can be due to “diversity fatigue” (para. 1) 
This occurs when people do not see results yet feel that they are paying a high emotional price 
for advocacy, making it harder to stay committed to the goal. People are tired of talking about 
the issues and frustrated that it has not turned into impactful results, while being overwhelmed by 
the plethora of issues at hand. Diversity fatigue is demonstrated within Atlassian’s survey. While 
80% of companies surveyed in 2018 believed that D&I was important, only 45% (compared to 
2017’s 55%) stated that their company had a formal D&I program, 35% (compared to 2017’s 
42%) participated in a discussion about diversity in tech, and 19% (compared to 2017’s 29%) 
participated in an employee resource group (ERG). It seems that companies’ and employees’ 
prioritizations of diversity are decreasing. Perhaps, this is because the participants no longer 
believed diversity was an employee issue, as they believed that individuals, national 
governments, and company/corporate initiatives play the largest role in improving D&I. 
 
4 Atlassian is an “enterprise software multinational that develops products for software development, project 
management, and content management” They serve over 135,000 customers (Unknown, 2020, para. 1). 
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Barriers to Workplace Diversity 
Homophily 
Companies and employees might feel diversity fatigue because of the barriers they face 
when attempting to diversify. This is known as the glass ceiling, upheld through barriers of 
homophily and stereotyping. Homophily, when ‘birds of a feather flock together,’ suggests that 
people are more likely to connect with those similar in “characteristics like age, race, gender, and 
income” (Byrne, 2018, para. 1). Homophily is present throughout our society, not only in the 
workforce (Messias et al., 2017). Therefore, companies need to be conscientious of it when 
hiring candidates.  
Rivera (2012) found that recruiters often look for candidates who are 1) a cultural fit to 
the firm and 2) cultural similarity to themselves. Finding a candidate who ‘fits’ the firm is 
illustrated by a participant who stated, “‘We want people who fit not only the way we do things, 
but who we are’” (p.1009). When asked why a recruiter did not select a candidate, he replied 
with, “‘He’s very gregarious… kind of a frat boy… I think he’s more of a [FIRM] person” 
(p.1009-1010). These recruiters looked for candidates who held personalities most similar to 
those of the firm. Beyond interviews, recruiters also identified personality traits, which they 
believed matched the firm, through candidates’ interests and extracurriculars on their resumes. 
Recruiters often use themselves to measure fit “because that’s all you have to go on” (p. 
1010). In the interview process, they typically found extracurricular or professional similarities 
that they “can relate to or that [they] know something about” to start the conversation (p. 1010). 
Another tool approximately 80% of participants described using was the ‘airplane test’ (p. 1010). 
That is, would I want to be stuck in an airport with this candidate?   
Kaneshina13 
 
These negative effects of homophily can be examined through Karimi et al.’s (2018) 
research. They examined how information travels through social networks of different 
homophily and group sizes. Within homophilic networks, they discovered that information does 
not disseminate as easily compared to networks with high levels of homophily. Therefore, 
implying that minority groups might not get information about a new job opening, workplace 
changes, or other important information as quickly as the majority-homophilic groups. This is 
demonstrated as men tend to refer more than women. On top of this, men refer more men to 
companies than they refer women (Fernandez & Rubineau, 2019, p. 89).   
Homophily upholds the glass ceiling as minority candidates learn about a job opening 
slower than their counterparts. Additionally, companies tend to choose candidates who are most 
similar to themselves or the firm. Perpetuating these processes of homophily constrains 
companies’ attempts to diversify and opportunities for underrepresented groups to work at 
homogenous-composed companies.  
Stereotyping 
Stereotyping, having preconceived notions of a group or individual, can also occur in the 
hiring process. This happens when companies decide to not select an individual based on these 
preconceived ideas, as demonstrated through Gonzalez et al.’s (2019) research. In their 
experiment, one pair of candidates had the same resumes except for their sex and qualifications 
“(meeting standards or higher)” (p. 187). Whereas, the other pair of candidates “differed by sex 
and parenthood status (with or without children)” (p. 187). They found that “childless candidates 
received more callbacks than candidates with children” (p. 192). Furthermore, “men were called 
back more frequently than women” at a 10.9% callback rate compared to 7.7% (p. 192). Even 
within the sub-group of women who were not mothers, men were called back at a higher rate 
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(13.6% vs. 12.4%). They concluded that discrimination is “grounded in employers’ stereotypes 
about the potential lower productivity of female applicants” (p. 196). Through this research, it is 
apparent that women and candidates with children were stereotyped and not hired as frequently 
as men and candidates without children. 
Perhaps men get called, or receive job offers, more frequently than women based on 
recruiters’ ideas of an ideal applicant. Van Vianen and Willemsen (1992) concluded that the 
ideal applicant had more masculine traits, such as, “confident,” “logical,” and “rational,” than 
feminine traits (p. 479). The rationality recruiters used when accepting and rejecting candidates 
was that applicants had differences in these traits. When female candidates made a feminine 
impression, their chances of being selected decreased. Whereas if a male candidate made a 
feminine or not as masculine impression, this did not affect his chances of receiving a job offer. 
A recent study from LinkedIn also shows how this has not changed 27 years later. On LinkedIn, 
recruiters are 13% less likely to look at a woman’s profile than a man’s, reducing the chances of 
women to be hired (Ignatova, 2019). Therefore, concluding that from companies preferring male 
traits, women can be discriminated against in the hiring process. 
 Gerdeman (2017) discovered that some candidates “whiten” their resumes to increase 
their chances of being hired. Whitening a resume consists of removing information that clearly 
points to the applicant's minority status such as removing race-centered student organizations, 
changing foreign names to sound more American, and adding Western interests. Through erasure 
of ethnic identity, researchers found that candidates are more than twice as likely to receive a call 
than their minority peers.  
Each of these studies, from selecting men more commonly than women to choosing 
candidates who appear to be “whiter,” demonstrate how stereotyping acts as a barrier to 
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diversifying talent. These stereotypes play a role in companies’ hiring less diverse candidates and 
upholds the glass ceiling, as well as, companies’ homogeneous workplaces. The preference for 
similarity in candidates perpetuates a lack of minority representation, within organizations, 
which causes workplace representation to barely change.  
In 2004, Fortune 100 companies were comprised of 71.2% of white male board of 
directors. Fourteen years later, in 2018, this number decreased to 62.2%, indicating that white 
women on boards has increased by only 5.4% over these fourteen years. On the other hand, 
female racial minority board members have only increased by 2.4%, from 3% to 5.4% (DeHaas 
et al., 2019). Despite the number of women in the workforce increasing by 15%,5 as well as, 
obtaining 10.5%6 more degrees, Corporate boards have remained to be filled with majority of 
white men (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018; Duffin, 2020). In fact, if 
women continue to join corporate boards, at the current rate, it could take more than 48 years to 
achieve full gender parity (Bellstrom, 2016). To combat the barriers of homophily and 
stereotyping, which uphold the glass ceiling, legislation might be a structurally supported 
solution to increasing diversity within companies. 
Gender Diversity Legislation 
As companies recognize the importance of gender diversity, governments have as well. 
Across the globe, governments have intervened in the private sector by creating legislation to 
increase women on corporate boards. Corporate boards are “essential bodies for governance and 
management and their efficiency determines the company’s performance” (Caliyurt, 2016, p. 
109). Their role is to “represent, formulate, and fulfill the interests and expectations of 
shareholders as owners of the company” (Aluchna & Aras, 2018, p.1). Yet, there is a lack of 
 
5 from 43.2% to 58.2.% between 2009 to 2018 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 2018) 
6 from 26.1% to 36.6% between 2004 to 2019 (Duffin, 2020) 
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women on corporate boards. In Western Europe, 32% of public companies’ corporate boards are 
women. In the U.S., women occupy 18.7% of board seats. Lastly, in Asia women are 6% of 
boardrooms (Desvaux et al., 2017). Countries across the globe have created legislation to 
increase gender diversity on corporate boards. Corporate board legislation can be categorized 
into two sectors: 1) voluntary quotas (Netherlands, Spain, Austria, UK, Australia) and 2) 
mandatory quotas (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, India, U.S.).  
Quotas 
Voluntary Quota 
European countries: the Netherlands,7 Spain,8 Austria,9 and the United Kingdom (UK) 
implemented a voluntary quota approach. Within the UK, they invoked Financial Times Stock 
Exchange (FTSE) 350 companies to obtain a 33% gender diversity by 2020 (Goyal et al., 2017). 
It has led to positive results, as the percentage of women on boards has almost doubled to 
become 23.5% (Tkachenko & Pervukhina, 2018, p.152). Additionally, UK companies that 
obliged with the voluntary quota led to “more independence, a greater likelihood of higher and 
diverse qualifications, and diverse functional background among women” (Goyal et al., 2018, 
p.35).  
According to Aluchna and Aras (2018), in 2010, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council also introduced a voluntary quota, or a recommendation, which 
advised companies to set measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity and then disclose 
them in their corporate diversity policies. Unfortunately, this voluntary approach has been 
 
7
 In 2019, Netherlands proposed that executive boards and supervisory boards of large companies have 30% females 
(Aluchna & Aras, 2018; DutchNews, 2019). 
8
 In 2007, Spain proposed 40% of state-owned companies with 250 or more employees need to have 40% of non-
executives and executives female by 2015 (Aluchna & Aras, 2018; Gabaldon, 2017).  
9
 In 2011, Austria proposed state-owned companies have a quota of 35% females on supervisory boards by 2018 
(Aluchna & Aras, 2018; McGrath, n.d.).  
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unsuccessful. The ASX female board members increased by only 4% between 2004 to 2017; 
however, in 2018, Australia had the highest diversity in the nation at 18.2%. 
Mandatory Quotas 
There are mandatory quotas in the European Union: Belgium,10 France,11 Germany,12 
Italy,13 Norway,14 as well as, India15 and the U.S. (Ford et al., 2012; Tkachenko & Pervukhina, 
2018; CA SB 826, 2018). Within the European countries, Norway, Spain, Iceland, France, and 
the Netherlands focused on quotas for public limited companies. While Finland and Iceland had 
quotas for state-owned companies, both Belgium and Italy required both public limited and state-
owned companies to implement quotas. These countries require state-owned, and or, listed 
companies to have 30 to 40% of women on their boards; however, Norway was the first 
company to initiate a woman on board quota.  
According to Kenerson (n.d.), in 2003, the 1997 Norwegian Public Limited Liability 
Companies Act was amended to establish a quota requirement for gender diversity on the board 
of directors in public companies. Norway gave companies five years to comply with the Bill. By 
February of 2008 all companies had complied. Norway now has the highest rates of female board 
representation in the world, increasing from 6%, in 2002, to 40.5%. 
 
10
 In 2012, Belgium required state-owned and listed companies to have 33% of executives and non-executives, by 
2017, and in-listed Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) by 2019 (Aluchna & Aras, 2018; Meier, 2018).  
11
 In 2011, France required 40% of non-executive directors in large listed and non-listed companies to be female by 
2017 (Aluchna & Aras, 2018; Zillman, 2016).  
12
 In 2015, Germany required roughly 110 of their largest listed companies to have 30% of the supervisory board 
females (Aluchna & Aras, 2018; Petroff, 2015).  
13
 In 2012, Italy required, by 2015, their listed companies and state-owned companies to be 33% females (Aluchna 
& Aras, 2018; Zampano, 2012).  
14
 In 2008, Norway required its listed companies to have at least 40% of their boards be women, or they would face 
dissolution (S.C., 2018). 
15
 India’s Companies Act, enacted in 2013, requires all stock exchange listed companies to have at least one female 
on its board (Tkachenko & Pervukhina, 2018).   
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Within Aluchna and Aras’ (2018) research they write that studies report either a 
“negative or nil impact of increased gender diversity in Norwegian boards on firm performance” 
(p.35). Other studies reported a decline in some financial parameters that implemented the law, 
while some reported a stock increase after 2005. Norwegian firms accumulated more capital, 
through raising debt or equity; but this can be attributed to the 2008 Financial Crisis, not the 
additional female boards.  
Additionally, the number of board seats was not changed because of the quota. Instead, 
firms replaced the male directors with females. This did not decrease the average age of boards, 
as the young females usually replaced the young male directors. Norway’s quota resulted in 
women board members having less CEO experience, being younger, more educated, and more 
likely to be employed as non-executive managers. The reform also did not have an impact on the 
operating costs or operating revenues. Additionally, firms that were affected by the quota had 
fewer layoffs (Aluchna & Aras, 2018).  
International Legislation Results 
 According to Jourova (2019), in October of 2018, the European Union’s largest publicly 
listed companies had 44% female board members. France had at least 40% of each gender at 
board level, while in Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Germany, 33% of board members were female. 
From 2010 to 2018, Italy and France have increased their female board members by more than 
30%. Belgium and Germany have seen increases of 20%. The countries with “binding quotas”16 
and “soft measures”17 have far outperformed those which take no action (p. 74). This is 
concluded as those with quotas have increased from 10% to 37.5%, while countries with soft 
 
16
 Belgium, Germany, France, Italy (Jourova, 2019, p. 74) 
17 Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden, United 
Kingdom (Jourova, 2019, p. 74). 
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measures have only increased from 12% to 25.6%. Then, countries with “no action”18 have only 
increased from 12.5% to 14.3% (p. 74). Along with increases in female board members, female 
board chairs and CEOs have also increased. In 2003, female board chairs were at 1.6% and in 
2019 it increased to 6.7%. Additionally, female CEOs increased from 2.5% in 2013 to 6.5% in 
2013, almost mirroring the change of female board chairs.  
Impact of Women on Boards 
Company’s Culture and Public Perception 
Women on boards positively impacts the company internally by increasing firm 
knowledge, board attendance and female retention rates, and externally, to the public and 
investors through participating in charity and Corporate Social Responsibility. This is 
demonstrated by Adams and Ferreira (2009). They discovered through examining data between 
1996 to 2003, from S&P 500, MidCap, and Small firms, that women have fewer attendance 
problems than male directors. Additionally, male directors have fewer attendance problems if the 
board is more gender diverse. Moreover, the more gender diverse boards are, the more likely 
other women are to join monitoring committees. Therefore, demonstrating to employees that the 
board is responsible and supportive of their female employees. These results are echoed in 
Bilimoria’s (2006) findings, as she concludes that women on boards have a positive relationship 
with high female retention rates.  
Kim and Starks (2016) argued that women add missing knowledge to boards. They 
hypothesized, “women provide specific types of functional expertise missing from the incumbent 
corporate boards” (p. 268). This is concluded as they found that women are more likely to offer 
 
18
 All other European Union countries (Jourova, 2019, p. 74). 
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experience within “Risk Management, Human Resources, Sustainability, Corporate Governance, 
Regulatory/Legal/Compliance, or Political/Government” (p. 269). They believed with more 
women on boards, there is an increase in diverse, available knowledge; thus, improving the 
decision-making and quality of the board’s advice. Miller and Triana (2009) discovered similar 
results. They found that more gender diverse boards product higher quality decisions.  
Using a sample of 185 Fortune 500 firms, from 1991 to 1994, Williams (2003) observed 
a relationship between the percentage of women on boards and firm philanthropy, as board 
members help determine how companies allocate their funds for charity. He found that women 
engage in more charitable activities at an average of $9.25M. Williams stated that the initial 
impression of these results might be that women are more inclined to donate since they are “less 
concerned about the economic needs of the firm than their male colleagues” (p. 8, 9). But he 
stated that this is an inaccurate perception. Donations can cultivate relationships with other firms 
and organizations; therefore, he hypothesized that perhaps this could positively impact future 
earnings.  
These findings are echoed by Bear et al. (2010). They found a positive relationship 
between the number of women on boards and strength ratings, “positive actions toward diversity 
and community stakeholders” for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (p. 208). Companies 
with high CSR typically have a positive reputation and can lead investors or customers to pay a 
premium for them, increase their abilities to attract new talent, and enhance employee 
satisfaction (Deloitte, 2016). This positive perception is also seen when companies increase 
women on their boards, they are perceived as ‘female-friendly employers,’ committing to both 
advancing men’s and women’s careers. This commitment can attract investors, the public, and 
female applicants (Sealy, 2008). Ultimately, women on boards can have positive effects, such as, 
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increasing firm knowledge, board attendance, female retention rates, charity donations, and 
better CSR. 
Financial Impacts 
Positive Effects 
In contrast to the impacts on company culture and public perception from women on 
boards, the financial impacts from women on boards are divided into positive and negative 
effects. Barrett (2019) found that the top 50 companies with the highest revenues have “at least 
one female director and 23% of their board seats are held by women” (p. 4). This positive impact 
of women on boards is supported through research from Credit Suisse (2015) and MSCI (2016) 
which were cited in the Bill, as well as, Chen et al.’s (2019) research (CA SB 826). Together, 
these case studies provide a variety of statistics that support why more women should serve on 
boards.  
While it can be argued that women on boards is not a direct causation for higher financial 
performance, as women can be appointed during times of company success, women are actually 
appointed to leadership during times of crisis. This is known as the Glass Cliff Effect. Utilizing 
the FTSE 100 Index, Ryan and Haslam (2005) discovered that in comparison to men, women are 
more often to be appointed as board members during a “general financial downturn and 
downturn in company performance” (p. 87).  
Bruckmuller and Branscombe (2011) were inspired by Ryan and Haslam’s (2005) 
research, so they decided to conduct two similar experiments of their own. In experiment one, 
they asked college students to read two different newspaper articles, which both had different 
versions. The first article focused on the upcoming retirement of the CEO. In one article it was 
led by a woman, in another it was led by a man. The second article focused on the company’s 
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financial status. In one article it was growing, in the other it was laying off people and closing 
stores. When students were asked to choose between the two equally qualified candidates, 62% 
of students chose the male candidate when companies which were doing well and led by a man. 
In contrast, when the male-led company was doing poorly 69% of participants chose the female 
candidate. In their second experiment, students either read that a company was doing poorly or 
very successfully. Then they read descriptions of a female and male candidate and rated their 
strengths. Through this experiment, Bruckmuller and Branscombe found that 67% of participants 
chose the man to lead the successful company, whereas 63% believed the woman should take 
over in a crisis. These results aligned with Ryan and Haslam’s (2005) findings that women tend 
to be selected to lead companies when companies are in crises.               
Credit Suisse discovered that companies which had at least one-woman board member 
had a Return on Equity (ROE) of 12.2%, whereas those with no women on boards had a ROE of 
10.1% (Dawson et al., 2015). ROE measures how effectively the company is using assets to 
generate profits (Hargrave, 2020). Cases of high ROE can indicate that companies with women 
on boards are using the assets more effectively than those with no women on boards. Credit 
Suisse also found that companies that had female board representation had 2.4 Price-To-Book 
Ratio (P/BV) compared to companies without women which were at 1.8. A P/BV reflects the 
market valuation of the company’s equity relative to the book value. A lower P/BV indicates that 
the stock is undervalued; thus, indicating that female representation leads to better valuation 
(Hayes, 2020).  
MSCI (2016) observed similar results. They analyzed U.S. companies between 2011 to 
2016. They discovered that companies with three women on boards outperformed those in 
financials that had no women on their boards. In periods that began with three women directors, 
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firms experienced median gains of ROE or 10% and Earnings Per Share (EPS) of 37%. A high 
EPS tends to indicate that the company is more profitable, indicating that three female directors 
on boards leads to higher EPS (Chen, 2020). On the other hand, companies with no women on 
boards experienced only median changes of 1% in ROE and actually decreased by 8% in EPS. 
They hypothesized that this could have occurred because “more diverse groups make better 
decisions” and “gender-diverse companies are more effectively using available talent pools” (p. 
6).  
Furthermore, Chen et al. (2019) examined the relationship between overconfidence, 
identified as the choice to hold company stocks or options, and female board representation (for 
516 firms between the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009). They discovered that female board 
representation “reduced the negative impact of the crisis on firm performance” (para. 10). 
Companies that had women on boards were less likely to adopt aggressive strategies. Those that 
did not have any women, on their boards, had a greater drop in performance.  
Negative Effects 
In contrast to these positive statistics, research from the past 20 years has found a 
negative relationship between percentage of women on boards and accounting financial 
performance measures, like Return on Assets (ROA), and Return on Equity, (ROE) and Tobin Q, 
as well as, market value (Post & Bryon, 2014; Pletzer et. al, 2015; Solal & Snellman, 2019; 
Chapple & Humphrey, 2014).  
Post and Bryon (2014) discovered through combining the results of 140 studies on 
women on boards and financial performance, while firms with more female directors have higher 
accounting returns, they do not have stronger market performance. They believe the results 
suggest that the relationship between market performance and women on boards is “conditioned 
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by the context” (p. 33). Because men tend to have greater human capital than women, they 
interpret this to suggest that this influences the investors’ evaluations of future earnings.  
Pletzer et al (2015) also looked at data from 20 studies on 3097 companies to conclude 
that females on corporate boards do not have a relationship with financial performance, 
measured as ROA, which indicates how efficient a company is using its assets to generate 
earnings, ROE, and Tobin’s Q, which shows whether a company is overvalued or undervalued 
(Hargrave, 2019; Hayes, 2019). In fact, it is “consistently small and non-significant” (p. 13). In 
comparison to Post and Bryon (2014), their meta-analysis included different study samples, 
supporting the conclusion that there is no relationship. Pletzer et al. argues that if female 
representation has no relationship with firm performance, “it seems reasonable to promote 
gender equality in board representation” (p. 33).  
Similarly, Chapple and Humphrey (2014) found no evidence between diversity and firm 
performance. Yet, observed weak evidence that more than one woman on boards is associated 
with lower returns than firms with one woman on the board. They concluded this through 
examining all firms’ returns, book-to-market, and market value on the S&P/ASX 300, the 300 
largest listed Australian companies, between January 2004 to September 2011. Despite running 
four differently weighted one-factor and four-factor models for “equally weighted,” “value 
weighted,”19 while adjusting for size, book-to-market, and momentum factors,20 they arrived at 
these conclusions (p.718).  
 
19
 This term value-weighted comes from prior research “(Brammer et al. (2007))” that identified that some women 
might be more value-relevant tin some industries than others (Chapple & Humphrey, 2014, p.714). 
20
 “At the end of December of year t - 1, stocks are ranked on their prior 1-year return and classified as up or down, 
using the 30th and 70th percentile breakpoints. We use the same size classifications as before. UMD (momentum 
factors) are calculated as the average return of the up portfolios minus the average return of the down portfolios” 
(Chappale & Humphrey, 2014, p. 715). 
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Despite Post and Bryon (2014), Pletzer et al. (2015), and Chapple and Humphrey (2014) 
finding little to no difference in firm performance with women on boards. Solal and Snellman 
(2019) learned that firms that increase board diversity suffer in a decrease of market value. 
Through examining 1,889 firms’ data, from 1998 to 2009, they found not only companies’ 
market values went down when adding women on boards, but also found that when firms made 
clear commitments to diversity initiatives, there was a greater decline in firm value. They 
believed this is due to the investors’ interpretations of these changes, or that the market believes 
firms are being pressured by “public pension funds” and are therefore “not motivated by a 
genuine preference for diversity” (p. 1283).  
Researchers have hypothesized that this negative relationship between financial measures 
and women on boards is due to investors’ perceiving that women will not increase future 
earnings like male directors will or the demand for female directors has allowed for women to 
select better performing firms (Post & Bryon, 2014; Farrell & Hersch, 2015). The Glass Cliff 
Effect, which is when women are appointed to leadership during times of crisis, is another 
reasoning behind this negative relationship (Ryan & Haslam, 200). Lastly, Solal and Snellman 
(2019) hypothesized that firms releasing corporate information to deliberately impact stock 
prices could affect female appointments, since these tend to receive a high amount of press (Lee 
& James, 2007). 
United States’ Legislation 
 As of September of 2018, the United States has also been trying to enact bills to increase 
women on corporate boards. This can be seen within Illinois, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and 
Washington. Among companies with market capitalization greater than $1B and companies that 
have at least two women on their boards, California ranks 37th (Kuhns et al., 2019). Yet, 
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California was the first to officially enact the Bill. California’s Senate Bill 826 is different from 
Norway’s. While Norway’s intended to provide equal opportunities for both men and women, 
California’s focuses on gender equality for women (Kenerson, n.d.). 
An In-Depth Look at California Senate Bill 826 
On February 28, 2019, Senator Hannah-Beth, who authored CA SB 826, spoke at Scripps 
College’s Laspa Center for Leadership’s Annual Summit Address (Scripps College, 2019). Here, 
she shared that Governor Brown decided to enact the Bill because a few days before he needed 
to sign it, Brett Kavanaugh had been appointed as Supreme Court Associate Justice (Tatum, 
2018). Governor Brown disagreed with this choice (ABC7.com, 2018). According to Senator 
Hannah-Beth, Governor Brown came to the realization that by signing this bill, he could allow 
for more women to be in positions of power. So less ‘tragedies’ like appointing men, with sexual 
assault allegations, into positions of power, would not occur (ABC7.com, 2018, para. 1). In 
Brown’s signing message (2018) he writes:  
“There have been numerous objections to this bill and serious legal concerns have been raised. I don’t 
minimize the potential flaws that indeed may prove fatal to its ultimate implementation. Nevertheless, 
recent events in Washington D.C.—and beyond—make it crystal clear that many are not getting the 
message… Given all the special privileges that corporations have enjoyed for so long, it’s high time 
corporate boards include the people who constitute more than half the ‘persons’ in America” (p.1). 
 
On September 30, 2018, California Senate Bill 826 was enacted (CA SB 826, 2018). 
According to the CA SB 826 Factsheet (2018), California Senators Jackson, Atkins and Leyva 
believed this bill was a “proactive approach to require more women directors on publicly held 
corporations in California.” They justified enacting this legislation because California is the “5th 
largest economy in the world.” Therefore, they believed California “sets an example for 
responsible business globally” (p. 1). This ensures that women, which “comprise over half of the 
population and make over 70% of purchasing decisions” are involved with “discussions and 
decisions that affect corporate culture, actions, and profitability” (McGreevy, 2018, para. 11) 
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They received support from a variety of organizations like the National Association of Women in 
Business, Alliance of Chief Executives, and the California Legislative Women’s Caucus 
(Jackson et al., 2018, p. 1).  
 This Bill declares that by the end of 2019, public companies that are headquartered in 
California, or principal executive offices (as stated by their SEC 10-K forms) that are in 
California should have a minimum of one female director on their boards. These companies are 
required to comply with the strict quota rules by the end of 2021. The rule expands beyond 
requiring one female director. If a company has six directors or more, the company should have a 
minimum of three female directors. If there are five director positions, they should have a 
minimum of two directors. Lastly, if there are four or fewer directors, they should have a 
minimum of one female director (CA SB 826). The requirements for the number of women on 
boards are all the same as Norway’s21 up until when there are nine board seats. In Norway’s 
legislation, if the board has nine members, each sex shall be represented by four members. In 
addition, if there are more than nine members on the board, in Norway, each sex should be 
represented by 40% (Unknown, 2003, p.503).  
Similar to Norway, which implemented a penalty system for companies that failed to 
adhere to the legislation threatening to dissolve companies if they failed to comply with the 
gender quota, California implemented a fine system (Kenerson, n.d., para. 6; CA SB 826, 2018). 
If these companies do not comply with the Bill, they can be fined for violations. The first 
violation is $100,000, while a subsequent violation is $300,000. The first deadline was on 
December 31, 2019. By this date, companies were required to add at least one female director. 
 
21
 For boards with 2-3 members, both sexes shall be represented. For boards with 4-5 members, each sex should be 
represented by at least 2 members. For boards with 6-8 members, each sex should be represented by 3 members.  
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The final deadline is December 31, 2021; by this time, companies add any remaining female 
board members to meet the requirements (CA SB 826, 2018).  
When the Bill was initially enacted, 89% of California based companies needed to make 
changes to comply with the Bill. By the end of 2019, the 2019 deadline, 33% (217) of California 
companies needed to appoint one female (Kuhns et al., 2019). In July of 2019, the California 
Secretary of State, Alex Padilla, was required to report the list of companies that were in 
compliance. This list had 184 companies in compliance and 537 not in compliance (Padilla, 
2019). This was not a drastic change from when the Bill was first enacted in January 2018, as 
29% or 183 companies were in compliance. In 2018, California ranked 29th among states with 
female directors, at 17.4%, but by the end of last year, after changes were made, it was ranked 
16th at 23% (Prang, 2020).  
Based on 2019 projections, by 2021, 199 companies will need to appoint at least one 
female director (Kuhns et al., 2019). As of March 2020, companies outperformed Kuhns et al.’s 
projections as 282 companies, out of 330, reporting at least 1 female director, are now in 
compliance with the Bill, leaving only 48 companies not in compliance (Padilla, 2020). 
Companies that have five director positions, should have a minimum of two directors. If there 
are four or fewer directors, they should have a minimum of one female director. At the time of 
enactment, only 11% met the 2021 requirements. Based on 2019 projections, by 2021, least 136 
companies will need to appoint at least three female directors and 276 companies will need to 
appoint at least two female directors (Kuhns et al., 2019). 
CA SB 826 Public Reactions 
When Norway’s bill was enacted in 2008, the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ansgar 
Gabrielsen, was highly in support of it. Although, the language he used, "fed up with the male 
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dominance in the Norwegian boardrooms" sparked controversy (Reinertsen, 2011, para. 1). This 
led to the Verdens Gang, Norway’s most popular newspaper, to spin his words into, “The 
Minister of Trade and Industry is Sick and Tired of the Men’s Club: Wants to Force Women into 
Boardrooms” (Aluchna & Aras, 2018, pg. 51). Californians’ complaints about the Bill echoed 
Norway’s.  
 From the start of its enactment, the Bill was immediately questioned. As written in the 
Mercury News (2018), Fox News commentator Tomi Lahren stated, “This is an absolute crock 
of crap. As a woman, I find this not only condescending but absolutely ridiculous” (para. 2). 
Venture capitalist and managing partner with Structure Capital, Jillian Manus, made the 
argument that by creating this restriction on companies, board positions would not be based on 
merit. He stated, “Women want to not just fill a slot but also add value” (para. 15). San Jose 
State University Associate Professor of Women, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Tanya Saroj 
Bakhru, also believed this Bill was not approaching board diversity through proper means. She 
stated that it was not the ‘right conversation.’ Instead, she believed that the ‘right conversation’ 
should be formed around making sure that women are “from all different racial and class 
backgrounds and are experiencing equity in the workplace” (para. 21). 
 Others believed that the Bill could be legally questioned. Law Professor at Stanford’s 
Rock Center for Corporate Governance, Joseph Grundfest, predicted that the law could be 
challenged due to the 1982 Supreme Court Ruling. This ruling created the precedent that a 
company is governed by the laws of the location in which it is incorporated, conflicting with the 
Bill, as California is trying to govern companies that are headquartered in California. Comstock 
wrote that if the Bill is changed, under these terms, it would apply to only 72 companies, instead 
of impacting 632 companies (Yoder, 2019).  
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Grundfest’s prediction was correct. On August 9, 2019, Judicial Watch, a conservative 
non-partisan educational foundation, filed a lawsuit against the Bill. The President of Judicial 
Watch, Tom Fitton, believes the Bill was “brazenly unconstitutional,” as it “employs express 
gender classifications” (Judicial Watch, 2019, para. 10). Then, in December of 2019, Creighton 
Meland, Jr. filed a lawsuit against the Bill. He is arguing that it is “sex-based discrimination” and 
goes against the Fourteenth Amendment22 (Symon, 2019, para. 7). With the Bill, he believes he 
is not granted the right to select a candidate. While there are negative reactions and lawsuits 
against the Bill, its status still remains as constitutional.  
A Scholarly Approach to Understanding Board Quotas 
 To justify the reasoning behind creating a mandatory quota for women on corporate 
board, it can be broken down into socio-political23 and managerial theory categories.24 These 
approaches provide a model for understanding the politicians’ perspectives of the Bill. Social-
political theory is the belief that equal representation is a fundamental civil right. On the other 
hand, managerial theory stresses the importance of direct and measurable impacts within the 
organization, culture and leadership, and company’s performance (Aluchna & Szapiro, 2018). 
While the theories present a way to analyze people’s beliefs for increasing women on 
boards, approaches reflect which theory is used when advocating for legislation. Tkachenko and 
Pervukhina (2018) identify two approaches which can be used as lenses to view the Bill: 1) 
instrumental approach, and 2) regulatory approach. The instrumental approach, which appeals to 
the managerial theory, considers gender diversity through a business lens like how gender 
 
22
 “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States” (Constitution of the United States, 1789). 
23
 Socio-political theory also encapsulates social justice/non-discrimination theory and gender/feminist theory 
(Aluchna & Szapiro, 2018) 
24
 Managerial theory encapsulates four theories: principal-agent, resource dependence and human capital, 
stakeholder, and diversity theories (Aluchna & Szapiro, 2018). 
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diversity legislation helps to maximize stock value for the owners (Aluchna & Szapiro, 2018). 
This approach is seen throughout the Bill as it states the reasoning behind enacting the Bill is to 
increase the firm's financial performance (CA SB 826). 
On the other hand, the regulatory approach, which appeals to the socio-political theory, 
considers gender diversity through a civil rights lens. It espouses the “moral obligation to the 
discriminated part of society—that is women” (Tkachenko & Pervukhina, 2018, p. 165). It is 
illustrated in the Bill through stating, “studies predict it will take up to 50 years to achieve gender 
parity” (CA SB 826, 2018, p.1). Therefore, inferring that this bill is necessary to achieve women 
workplace advancement  
These approaches provide a model for understanding the politicians’ perspectives of the 
Bill. Governor Brown’s support for the Bill exemplifies the regulatory approach. As reported in 
the Los Angeles Times, he wrote, “it’s high time corporate boards include the people who 
constitute more than half the ‘persons’ in America” (McGreevy, 2018, para. 1). He implied that 
it is within women’s rights to be on corporate boards, rather than using financials to explain why 
he believes this Bill is important.  
On the other hand, Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson, who was responsible for creating the 
Bill, employed an instrumental approach. She stated that a woman’s perspective is crucial for 
“discussions and decisions that affect corporate culture, actions, and profitability,” implying the 
close connection between gender-diverse leadership and business success (para. 11). Similar to 
the politicians, studies that show the impacts that companies gain from appointing women 
directors, take an instrumental approach (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Kim & Starks, 2016; 
Williams, 2003; Bear et al., 2010; Barrett, 2019; DeHaas et al., 2015; Eastman et al., 2016; Chen 
et al., 2019). Using Tkachenko and Pervukhina’ (2018) regulatory and instrumental approaches, 
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we can create a framework to better interpret how people are persuading others that females on 
boards are positive. 
My Research’s Focus on California Tech Firms  
While tech companies have been working to improve their gender diversity, gender parity 
is far from being achieved. While women make up 59% of the total workforce, only 30% of 
women are in tech companies even though 35.5% of Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
Math (STEM) major graduates with bachelor’s degrees are female (Beheshti, 2019; Catalyst, 
2019).  While it is not perfect parity, as 50% of STEM majors are not female, steps should be 
taken to increase parity in these fields to encourage more women to become involved in STEM 
to prevent parity to ever being achieved. In fact, “once women enter the tech field, they are 45% 
more likely to leave than men” (Catalyst, 2019, para. 2). They most often leave the tech industry 
because of isolation, male-dominated work environments, and a lack of women role models.  
Lack of diversity is best demonstrated through GQ photoshopping two women into their CEO 
photo filled with fifteen men in June of 2019. Generally, when companies are how they are 
improving diversity, they will give responses like, “diversity takes time,” “we want to hire the 
best candidates,” “this is an industry wide problem,” and “our next hire will be a woman” as a 
means to excuse their inaction (Molla, 2019).  
Bay Area25 companies have been struggling with company gender diversity. Beyond the 
low stats, this is best highlighted through examples of women feeling inferior to their male 
counterparts. There have been reported cases of women being asked to take notes in meetings, 
being asked to spend “intimate time” with their coworkers and having to change their demeanor 
 
25
 The Bay Area consists of nine counties: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa 
Clara, Solano, and Sonoma (Wikipedia, 2020). 
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to navigate the predominantly unwelcome male space. In fact, women often leave these tech 
companies because of the “workplace conditions” and “feeling stalled in one’s career” (Mundy, 
2017, para. 23). These narratives have been reported from women throughout Silicon Valley on 
elephantinthevalley.com (2017). Here, women report issues of “feedback & promotion, 
inclusion, unconscious biases, motherhood, and harassment and safety” (para. 1). 90% of 
participants “witnessed sexist behavior at company offsites and/or industry conferences,” 87% 
received “demeaning comments from male colleagues,” and 60% reported “unwanted sexual 
advances” (Unknown, 2015, para. 11, 14, 18). These narratives are best demonstrated through 
some of the biggest sexual assault and harassment cases at Tinder, Uber, and Google. 
At Bumble, in 2014, Whitney Wolfe Herd, now founder of Bumble who was before VP 
of Marketing at Tinder, sued Tinder co-founders alleging that they had called her a “whore” and 
sent “a barrage of horrendously sexist, racist, and otherwise inappropriate comments, emails and 
text messages” (Bonos, 2018, para. 7). That same year, after the lawsuit was settled, Whitney 
Wolfe released a new dating platform, Bumble. Bumble strives to “advance gender equality — 
and putting an end to the misogyny that still plagues society” (Wolfe Herd, 2019, para 4). They 
do this through implementing features like only allowing women to message first on the app. 
They are also working to help pass a law against sending unsolicited nude images in Texas and 
automatically blur nude images sent on their platform, then giving users the option to see it 
(Wolfe Herd, 2019).  
Then at Uber, in February of 2017, negative light was shed on Uber after a former 
employee blogged about her “very, very strange year” (Fowler, 2017, para. 1). In her post, she 
shared stories of her manager implying that he wanted to have sex with her at the first day on the 
job, not being promoted due to undocumented performance problems, and women employees not 
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receiving a team leather jacket because there was too few of them to justify spending that 
amount. During her time at Uber, the percentage of women quickly declined from 25% to less 
than 6%. Regardless of her continuous reports to HR, nothing was resolved.  
More recently, at Google, in August of 2017, a male Google employee, James Damore, 
argued that women have inherent differences than men, which leads to their underrepresentation 
in tech (Conger, 2017). He stated that women are more extroverted than men, which is expressed 
as “gregariousness rather than assertiveness” (para. 19). Therefore, “this leads to women 
generally having a harder time negotiating salary, asking for raises, speaking up and leading” 
(para 19). He also claimed that another Big 5 Personality Trait, neuroticism, which is higher 
anxiety and lower stress tolerance, contributes to the “higher levels of anxiety women report and 
the lower number of women in high stress jobs” (para 19). After this posting, Google fired him. 
Google’s CEO, Sundar Pichai, stated that Damore’s post had “advanced harmful gender 
stereotypes in our workplace” (Nicas, 2018, para. 6). 
These cases of sexual assault and harassment are well-known possibly because of the 
huge impact these companies have on the world. In fact, if the Bay Area itself were a country it 
would be ranked the 19th largest economy (Avalos, 2018). The number of women on corporate 
boards differs per region in California.26 In the Bay Area, specifically, 17.6% of directors are 
female. Out of all California counties,27 San Francisco has the highest prevalence of female 
directors at 21.2%. While San Francisco has the highest prevalence of female directors in 
 
26
 In the Central Coast and the Valley, 14.9% are female. Lastly, Southern California has only 12.8% female 
directors. Moreover, Southern California has the highest percentage of boards with no female directors at 33%. The 
other regions of California, the Bay Area and Central California, have approximately the same percentage at 21% 
and 20% (Barrett, 2019).  
27
 The lowest percentage of female directors is in Orange (12.4%) and San Diego (12.9%). These counties also have 
the highest percentages of boards with no female directors. San Diego is at 40.8% and Orange is at 31.8% (Barrett, 
2019). 
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California, they also have the highest percentages of boards with zero female directors, ranked 
second to lowest at 18.8% with San Mateo ranking lowest at 17.9% (Barrett, 2019).  
RESEARCH ROADMAP 
After reading the canon of both literary and empirical analyses, I realized there was a 
missing gap in the research. While the research focused on gender diversity, as whole, research 
that I had come across, had not investigated the implications of industry-specific impacts. 
Therefore, my research will be based on understanding the implications of CA SB 826 on tech 
firms. Throughout my research, I have defined a tech firm as a company which is reliant on 
technology to create their main product or platform; however, these companies are not 
aerospace or telecommunication firms. In other words, without technology, their product or 
platform would be non-existent.  
Specifically, within the literary research, I identified a missing gap. Through the analysis, 
the context of the Bill was created, and the importance of this Bill was exemplified, but the 
voices from the people at companies who were actually impacted by the Bill—company 
employees—was missing. Specifically, within the empirical analyses, I found a discrepancy 
amongst the research (Post & Bryon, 2014; Farrell & Hersch, 2015). While some research, 
specifically created by firms, like MSCI (2016) and Credit Suisse (2015), demonstrated the 
positive impacts of women on corporate boards, most economic journals discussed the little 
impact women had on firm financial performance.  
In my thesis, I have taken both a qualitative-interview approach, conducting interviews to 
understand the Bay Area employees’ perspectives of their relationships with boards and the 
actions their companies are taking to improve gender diversity, and an empirical approach, to 
discover if there is a relationship between California tech companies’ stock price performance 
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and women on boards. Ultimately, utilizing both employees’ insights and data, allows for my 
thesis to have more holistic findings.  
My research will be broken down as follows: the interviews and empirical analysis 
section, will have an introduction, methods, and results section for both experiments; then, I will 
state my limitations of the research, as well as, a few next steps; lastly, in the conclusion section 
I will interweave my findings from both experiments and explain how this thesis brings to light 
what to observe in the near-future.  
INTERVIEW ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
When the Bill was first enacted, there were a variety of opinions. While some questioned 
its constitutionality, others questioned the tokenism that could be perpetuated through it. That is, 
will woman still be valued in the board room or will others believe they were selected through a 
non-merit-based process (Sulek, 2018)? Therefore, in this study, I was curious to learn about the 
employees’ perspectives of the Bill, their knowledge of it, and their experience with tokenism. 
Within my internship experience, I noticed that average-level (manager-level) employees often 
have strong relationships with their Associates, Managers, Directors, and Chiefs. Then, they 
interact with the Vice Presidents through high level strategy planning; however, rarely, do they 
interact with the Board. Therefore, I was also interested in learning about their relationship with 
their boards and how knowledgeable they were about board responsibilities.  
Additionally, I wanted to understand if participants believed improving board diversity 
could impact their firms, as well as, if they believed their firms would comply with it. Lastly, 
tech firms have a large spotlight on them due to their influence on the world and economy, as 
well as, the recent controversial gender diversity events (Wolfe Herd, 2019; Fowler, 2017; Nicas, 
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2018). So, I was curious to learn if participants believed the fine was an incentivizing factor and 
if press plays an influence when their firm makes decisions. I used these curiosities to shape my 
hypotheses, as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1: Participants who work at companies, which are in compliance with the 
Bill, are more likely to be (more than 50%) aware of the Bill in comparison to those not in 
compliance. This is based on the assumption that companies are more likely to tell their 
employees that they are in compliance with the Bill, than those who are not in compliance. I 
presume that companies are more willing to tell their employees good news, rather than directly 
address their lack of diversity.  
Hypothesis 2: Participants that are aware of their boards’ appointment process will be 
more likely (over 50% will believe) to have, or state that employees have, strong relationships 
with board members. This is based on the assumption that there is a correlation between 
understanding the board’s appointment process with the relationship level employees have with 
the board. I presumed that there would be more dialogue or transparency about the board 
selection process, which then translates into strong board-employee relations. 
Hypothesis 3: Participants will be more likely (over 50% will believe) to believe that 
legislation surrounding C-Suites gender-quotas can impact the company diversity instead of 
board gender-quotas. I came to this hypothesis through reading Kuhns et al.’s (2019) work. They 
argue that a bill, which focuses on increasing women in C-Suites, could be more effective in 
impacting the company’s gender diversity. Through the combination of this academic research, 
along with, my previous internship experience, I found that employees are more in contact with 
C-Suite members than board members. Therefore, I assumed that employees would believe C-
Suite quotas could be more effective in impacting board-diversity.  
Kaneshina38 
 
Hypothesis 4. Participants will not likely (more than 50% will not believe) believe that 
the $100,000 to $300,000 fine for not complying with the Bill is an incentivizing factor. Because 
most tech companies pay an average salary of $150,000, I assumed that this fine would not be an 
incentivizing factor (Thurm, 2019). I believe that the positive reputation could be a greater gain, 
rather than the fine. I believed it could cost more money to recruit, at an average of $4,000, as 
well as, annually pay a new board member an average salary of $43,500 (Zojceska, 2019; 
Tenenbaum, 2020). 
Hypothesis 5: Participants will be less likely to (less than 50% will believe) believe their 
company prioritizes gender-diversity. Around 25% of women hold tech positions, whereas 
technical positions typically represent a majority of available positions in a company and are at 
the core of the company’s existence (White, 2020). Due to the scandals of sexual harassment in 
tech and the lack of women representation in tech companies, I did not believe employees would 
believe that diversity is prioritized (Bonos, 2018; Fowler, 2017; Conger, 2017).  
Participants 
 15 female interviewees participated in this research. I decided to only focus on 
interviewing females as I believed that they would be in more support and aware of the Bill, 
since this would be directly impacting their futures, as opposed to males. These participants 
worked at Bay Area companies ranging from 2K to 140K employees with annual 2018 revenue’s 
ranging from $600K to $40B, with an average of $14B. The 2019 total employee gender 
breakdown of 10 of these companies, excluding the 5 that do not report this data, averaged at 
65% males and 37% females. Tech companies, gathered from 177 companies, average at 72% 
males and 28% females (Rangarajan, 2018). Additionally, the 2019 Board of Directors genders 
Kaneshina39 
 
averaged 8 males and 3 females. Out of the participants’ companies, 47% of them were in 
compliance, with the Bill, while the others were not. 
Participants worked in business and engineering departments28 at their companies, 
worked at their company for 2 years,29 and are approximately 31 years old. Additionally, a 
majority of participants are Claremont Colleges alumni. They were found by filtering on 
LinkedIn by company and school. They were recruited through engaging Facebook and LinkedIn 
posts, personal messages, and through connections.  
Unlike other studies done on campus with other students, with the incentivizing factor of 
receiving cash or gift cards from participating, I did not offer these incentives to these 
employees. Because I was interviewing full time salary employees, I did not find it necessary to 
incentivize them with monetary things, as their thresholds for monetary incentivizing are likely 
higher than college students. 
Methods 
I believed qualitative interviews, instead of surveys, would be the best way to understand 
the employees. Through these interviews, I believed participants would be more likely to expand 
on their thoughts and feel less limited by the structure surveys provide. One interview was 
conducted at a cafe, while the rest (14) were conducted over the phone as a result of 
convenience. Interviews ranged from 30 minutes to 1 hour long. I asked interviewees a series of 
15 questions that I divided into the following themes:  
● Knowledge of the Bill 
● Company’s Board of Directors 
 
28
 Only 6 participants allowed for this information to be shared. 
29
 Only 4 participants allowed for this information to be shared. 
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● Opinions about the Bill 
● Gender Diversity & Personal Experiences 
Results 
Knowledge of the Bill 
 40% (6) of participants had heard of the Bill. When asked about their opinions about the 
Bill were, generally, participants described it as “fair and effective.” They were glad to hear that 
the government was taking action. They believed structural change has significant power to 
create more equity on corporate boards. While all participants thought positively about the Bill, 
two participants voiced concerns. One participant was worried about the constitutionality of the 
Bill aligning with the same concerns that the Judicial Watch voiced (Judicial Watch, 2019). 
Another participant brought up her concern of women being perceived as an act of tokenism, 
which is the policy or practice of making only a symbolic effort, instead of making genuine 
efforts, rather than being in positions due to merit, which was aligned with Jillian Manus’s 
opinion (Sulek, 2018).  
I hypothesized that participants who work at companies with more than two female 
directors will be more likely to be aware (more than 50%) aware of the Bill in comparison to 
those with two or less female directors (H1). This hypothesis was supported, as there were eight 
participants whose companies were in compliance with the Bill. Of these eight, five (62.5%) 
were aware of the Bill.  
 Out of the 40% (6) of participants who stated they had heard about the Bill before our 
interview, within these 6, only 20% (3) of participants stated that they had discussed the Bill at 
their workplace through an announcement in a leadership forum, in an internal group online 
forum, and with other coworkers. These participants stated that their workplace spoke positively 
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about it but did not provide many details. On the other hand, the remaining three participants 
who had heard about the Bill previously, stated that their workplace did not discuss the Bill.  
When asked if discussing current events and politics was common in their workplace 
53% (8) of participants stated that these topics were discussed with co-workers informally, but 
never in a group setting. One of these participants brought up that when discussing politics with 
coworkers, you have to be wary of who you discuss them with. Out of the three participants who 
stated they heard about the Bill and discussed it at their workplace, only two stated that they 
discussed politics at their workplace. 
Company’s Board of Directors 
 When asked if participants were aware of the process board members are elected in only 
27% (4) stated they were aware. Only one participant, with five unsure and nine answering “no,” 
stated that there has been discussion about the Bill from the board level. In general, employees' 
likelihood of chatting about the board seemed unlikely with only 20% (3) of participants stating 
that this occurs.  
I hypothesized that participants who are aware of their boards’ appointment process will 
be more likely (over 50% will believe) to have, or state that employees have, strong relationships 
with board members (H2). However, this hypothesis was not proven when participants said they 
were unsure (2) of the average relationship, or it was “nonexistent,” (6), or minimal (7). Out of 
the participants (3) who believed the relationship was nonexistent, their responses were varied in 
what kind of role they believed their board played in decision making, varying from a large role 
to nonexistent to it being unknown. Additionally, how much of a role boards play in decision 
making varied per company. Out of those (7) who believed their relationship was minimal, three 
believed they had a minimal role in decision making, two thought they had a large role, and two 
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were unclear of the role. Through these responses, it can be inferred that most employees do not 
have a relationship with the board, and therefore, are not aware of their role and the impact they 
have on the company.  
Opinions about the Bill 
 Increasing women within C-Suites leads to better economic returns, outperforming peers 
in profitability and risk management (Buellingen, 2018). Therefore, Kuhns et al. (2019) argues 
that a bill which focuses on increasing women in C-Suites could be more effective in impacting 
the company’s gender diversity. So, I assumed that participants would be more likely to (over 
50% will believe) to believe that legislation surrounding C-Suites gender-quotas can impact the 
company diversity instead of Board gender-quotas (H3). 80% (12) of participants agreed, 
proving my hypothesis correct. They stated that since employees more frequently interact with 
C-Suite Executives than the board they could have more influence and visibility in changing the 
company’s gender diversity.   
 If companies do not comply with the Bill, they will be fined $100,000 to $300,000. I 
hypothesized that participants will not likely (50% or less) believe that the fine for not 
complying with the Bill is an incentivizing factor (H4). 40% (6) of participants believed that 
without the fine, rather, if the Bill was voluntary, their company would comply. Out of these 
participants, 66.7% (4) believed that the fine is not incentivizing. In contrast, 27% (4) believed 
that their company would not comply, while one participant omitted their answer and four others 
could not come to a conclusion. Out of these participants, 2 believed that the fine was not an 
incentivizing factor. The other two brought up that it depends on the size of the company, stating 
that smaller companies will be more likely to be impacted by the fine than large corporations. In 
33% (5) participants believed that the press plays a role in decision making at their company.  
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47% of the participants’ companies were in compliance with the Bill at the time of the 
interview. When asking those participants, whose companies do not comply, five believed that 
their company would comply, two believed that there was not a likelihood of the company 
complying, and one was unsure.  
Gender Diversity & Personal Experiences 
  Participants voiced that gender diversity is prioritized at their companies through 
recruiting processes and attempts to retain female talent, as well as an emphasis on pay equity. I 
initially hypothesized that 50%, or less, of participants would believe their company prioritizes 
gender-diversity (H5). This was wrong, as all companies actually mentioned that their companies 
have Women Employee Resource Groups, or ERGs. Lastly, when asked if participants felt that 
they have ever felt tokenized by their current coworkers due to a part of their identity, all 
participants unanimously said they had not.  
Discussion 
Three, out of my five, hypotheses were supported (H1, H3, H4). I found that participants 
at companies who were in compliance with the Bill were more likely to know about the Bill, as 
62.5% of participants’ companies who were in compliance with the Bill knew about it (H1). 
Additionally, I learned that 80% of participants believed C-Suite quota legislation could be more 
effective in impacting gender-diversity, proving my hypothesis correct (H3). Lastly, I discovered 
that the fine was not an incentivizing factor for companies to comply with the Bill, as 66% of 
participants were in agreement (H4). 
On the other hand, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were not proven. Hypothesis 2, the assumption 
that participants who are aware of their boards’ appointment process are more likely to have 
strong relationships with board members, was nowhere close to being proven correctly. This is 
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due to the fact that most participants stated they had little to no relationship with the board. In 
contrast, Hypothesis 5, was proven incorrectly, as all participants believed that their companies 
were prioritizing gender-diversity.  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
In this study, I hope to discover if there is a relationship between stock price performance 
and women on boards. The first two hypotheses focus on exact stock prices and percentage of 
women on boards, while the last two focus on percentage change (represented as % ∆). I wanted 
to include percentage change in my hypotheses, so I could better understand the change in values 
year-over-year. Additionally, I used dummy variables, two standard deviations above the average 
versus below to compare two sides, as opposed to expecting stock prices to correspond only with 
increases in percentage of women. My null hypotheses are as follows:  
● Hypothesis 1: There is no statistically significant relationship between stock price 
performance and percentage of women on corporate boards. I arrived at this hypothesis 
through reading economic journals which also came to this conclusion (Post & Bryon, 
2014; Pletzer et. al, 2015; Solal & Snellman, 2019; Chapple & Humphrey, 2014). 
● Hypothesis 2: There is no statistically significant relationship between stock price 
performance and percentage of women two standard deviations above the average.  
● Hypothesis 3: There is no statistically significant relationship between percent change of 
stock price return and percent change of women on corporate boards.  
● Hypothesis 4: There is no statistically significant relationship between percent change of 
stock price return and percent change of women on corporate boards, grouped by dummy 
variables representing two standard deviations above the average versus below.   
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Methods 
 First, I used the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to narrow 
down the tech companies I wanted to look at. After looking through the whole NAICS list, I 
identified 24 codes, which would fall under technology. Then, I used the Hoover’s Database to 
find companies, which were listed under these 24 industries, and compared these companies to 
the original Excel spreadsheet that was provided by the CA government. Once I received the list 
of companies, I went ahead and used Hoovers to find the stock ticker for each of these 
companies. After gathering that information, I imported the list of tickers into WRDS CRSP 
database, which then outputted the stock prices from 2009 to 2019 for these companies. I ended 
up with approximately 230 companies. After extracting the aerospace and telecommunication 
companies, focusing only on 12 codes, I was left with 67 companies (Table 1 & Table 2). 
 I collected Board of Directors information from SEC 10-K filings under the Power of 
Attorney and Signatures sections. Gender is not stated in the filings, so I had to assume gender 
based on the Director’s names. If I was unfamiliar with the name, I Googled the Director and 
determined their gender through looking at photos of them. The Board of Directors signed the 
10-K at different months, so in order to create consistency between the time period the Director 
served along with the stock price, I averaged stock prices over the 12 months for each of the ten 
years.  
 Grouping by percentile brackets and averaging percentage of female directors between 
years 2009 to 2019, the average percentage of female directors ranged from 0 to 55. The most 
often occurring average of female directors was in the 15-20% range, making up 23% of the 
dataset. That was followed by 0-5% and 10-15%, which both separately make up 18% of the 
dataset (Graph 1).  
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Graph 1. Average (10 Year) Percentage of Female Directors by Percentile Bracket 
 
Next, the percentile bracket with the highest average stock returns, from 2009 to 2019, was 20-
25%, averaging at $144.96. The lowest percentile bracket was 0-5%, averaging at $14.55 (Graph 
2).  
Graph 2. Average (10 Year) Stock Price by Percentile Bracket 
 
Lastly, the year with the highest average stock prices was in 2019 (Graph 3). Through this graph 
it appears that a low percentage of female directors leads to the highest average stock prices, as 
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0-5% consistently remains above the other percentile brackets for eight years. This hypothesis 
will be tested in Regression 1.  
Graph 3. Average Stock Price by Percentile Bracket from 2009 - 2019. 
 
Model 
 My model analyzes the effect of women on boards on stock prices. Each regression 
includes the average stock prices for each year acting as the control variable. I ran four linear 
regressions to discover if there is a relationship between stock prices and percentage of women 
on boards. Each of the four regressions follow this format:  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑋𝑖2 +  𝛽3 𝑋𝑖3 + 𝜖𝑖  
 
Regression 1. Is there a relationship between stock prices, the percentage of female directors, 
and average industry stock prices per year?  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑠𝑝0 +  𝑝𝑤𝑑1 ∗  𝑥𝑖  + 𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑝2 ∗   𝑥𝑖2  +  𝜖𝑖  
Regression 2. Is there a relationship between stock prices, percentage of female directors two 
standard deviations above the average, and average industry stock prices per year?  
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𝑌𝑖 = 𝑠𝑝0 + 2𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒1  ∗  𝑥𝑖  + 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑝2 ∗   𝑥𝑖2  +  𝜖𝑖 
Regression 3. Is there a relationship between percentage change stock price, year over year, 
percentage change women, and percent change average industry stock price?  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑝0 +  𝑝𝑤𝑑1  ∗  𝑥𝑖  + 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑝2 ∗   𝑥𝑖2  +  𝜖𝑖 
Regression 4. Is there a relationship between percentage change stock price, year over year, 
percentage change women above two standard deviations, and percent change average industry 
stock price? 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑝𝑐𝑠𝑝0 + 𝑝𝑐2𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒1 ∗  𝑥𝑖  + 𝑝𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑠𝑝2 ∗   𝑥𝑖2 +  𝜖𝑖 
Here, sp is defined as the stock price for each company, pwd is the percentage of women 
directors, asp is average stock price. Then, any variables that start with pc indicate that this is the 
percent change of the variables. 2sdabove is the binary variable set equal to 1 if the variable is 
two standard deviations above the mean of women directors and 0 if otherwise. Pc2sdabove is 
the binary variable set equal to 1 if the variable is two standard deviations above the mean of 
percent change of women directors and 0 if otherwise. 
From Dataset 1. Descriptive Statistics, we learn that stock prices average at $55.22; 
however, this data is skewed by a high standard deviation of $123.83 and the maximum stock 
price at $1,195.81, which was Google’s (GOOGL) stock price in 2019 (Dataset 5). The average 
industry stock price’s average is $53.82, similar to the stock price variable’s average; however, 
the average industry stock price has a lower standard deviation of $14.09. The percent change of 
stock prices is at an average of 6.4%. Although, this is highly skewed by the standard deviation 
of 99.75%, which can most likely be attributed to its maximum, Turtle Beach Corporation 
(HEAR). It’s percent change in stock price in 2017 was 1635% (Dataset 6).  
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The percentage of women directors averages at 13.18%, with the minimum being 0%. 
This is also the mode as it occurs 35% of the ten years (172 times). The maximum is 62.5%, 
which was Zendesk’s (ZEN) percentage of women directors in 2018 (Dataset 7). Rarely is the 
percentage of women directors two standard deviations above the mean, as it occurs at an 
average of 2.86%. Then, the percent change of women directors is 0.22% with the minimum 
amount of percent change being -100%, which occurs 6% of the time (30 times). The maximum 
is at 300% which was VM Ware (VMW) in 2012 (Dataset 8). Similar to the percentage of 
women directors, the mode is 0, which occurs a total of 69% of the time (337 times). The high 
standard deviations throughout the data, relative to the means, indicates that there is a large range 
of variability between stock prices and percentage of female directors. In other words, companies 
stock prices and percentage of female directors are unique to each firm and not necessarily 
consistent throughout California tech companies.  
Results 
Regression 1: Stock Prices and % of Women Directors  
 In this regression, the only variable that was statistically significant was the average 
industry stock prices (p = 0.031). The percentage of women variable was not statistically 
significant (p = 0.303) nor highly correlational at an R value of 0.075 (Dataset 3). This weak 
relationship is echoed with the R² value of 0.015. Only 1.5% of the observed variation can be 
explained by the x-variables, average industry stock prices and percentage of women. While the 
variation can barely be explained by the x-variables, they do affect the stock price. Although, the 
effect can mainly be attributed to the average stock price effect, not the effect of percentage of 
women; therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Dataset 2).  
Regression 2: Stock Prices and % of Women Directors Two SD Above the Average 
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 This regression echoed similar results as Regression 1, as the only statistically significant 
variable was the average industry stock price (p = 0.013). While the correlational value was 
higher than Regression 1, it still was low at an R value of 0.125 (Dataset 4). The two standard 
deviations above variable was not statistically significant (p = 0.650). With a R² value of 0.013, 
it indicates that the linear relationship is weak. Therefore, only 1.3% of the observed variation 
can be explained by the x-variables, average industry stock prices and two standard deviations 
above. While the variation can barely be explained by the x-variables, they effect the stock price. 
Although, like Regression 1, the effect can mainly be attributed to the average stock price effect, 
not the two standard deviations above (Dataset 2). Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected (Hypothesis 2). 
Regression 3: % ∆ in Stock Prices and % ∆ of Women Directors 
 These next two regressions, Regression 3 and 4, focus on percent change, which are 
different from Regressions 1 and 2. Accounting for percentage change allows us to understand 
the differences between two years. Similar to Regressions 1 and 2, the only statistically 
significant variable was the change in average industry stock price (p = 0). With a R² value of 
0.196, it indicates that the linear relationship is stronger than Regressions 1 and 2, as 19.6% of 
the observed variation can be explained by the x-variables, average industry stock price and 
percent change of women directors. While the x-variables effect the stock price, this is once 
again mainly attributed to the average industry stock price variable. Because not all p-values are 
significant, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected (Dataset 2, Hypothesis 3).  
Regression 4: % ∆ in Stock Prices and % ∆ in Women Directors Two SD Above the Average 
 This regression is similar to Regression 3, as it measures the variables in percent changes. 
In this regression, the average industry percent change stock price was statistically significant (p 
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= 0). The dummy above variable was not significant (p = 0.742).  Similar to the previous three 
regressions, I find that the x-variables effect the stock price because of the average industry 
percent change stock price. Not all p-values are significant, so we also cannot reject the null 
hypothesis (Dataset 2, Hypothesis 4).  
Discussion 
Ultimately because the percentage of women p-value was never statistically significant, 
the null hypotheses could not be rejected. Therefore, aligning with other research to indicate that 
there is no relationship with the percentage of female directors and stock prices (Post & Bryon, 
2014; Pletzer et. al, 2015; Solal & Snellman, 2019; Chapple & Humphrey, 2014). While 
hypotheses results are similar to others, it leads me to wonder how the percentage of female 
directors on companies is often framed as positively impactful (CA SB 826). Perhaps this is 
because these studies focus on accounting measures of financial performance like ROE, ROA, 
P/BV, and EPS, whereas my study and other scholars focus on market performance (Dawson et 
al., 2015; Eastman et al., 2016). Whether or not these measures are correlated has been up for 
debate, as researchers are unsure if “they can be treated as an equivalent, interchangeable 
measures of firm financial performance” within management research (Gentry & Shen, 2010, p. 
515). Through Gentry and Shen’s (2010) research, utilizing firms’ financials from 1961 to 2008, 
they discovered that there is a high correlation between accounting profitability and market 
performance; however, there is no evidence of convergence. In other words, there is no evidence 
that both of these measures provide the same conclusion. Therefore, this conclusion can provide 
reasoning as to why accounting measures of financial performance might support women on 
boards, while market measures do not.  
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LIMITATIONS & NEXT STEPS 
 In general, both of these studies focused only on tech companies; therefore, these results 
cannot be seamlessly extended into other industries.  
Interview Analysis 
The findings of this study are inherently limited based on participant pool’s size and 
participants. The participant pool only includes 15 participants. Therefore, it cannot be assumed 
that these opinions are shared across all San Francisco tech companies; however, through their 
experiences we are able to get a glimpse on awareness and a sample of judgements on perceived 
effects and changes. Additionally, these interviews are not necessarily indicative of what is 
happening across California public tech companies, since these participants came from only Bay 
Area headquartered companies. Therefore, through a broader sample across a wider set of 
industries, there might be different results given the amount of recent press coverage on gender 
diversity within tech.  
Lastly, the participants themselves are more likely to be knowledgeable, and in favor, of 
the Bill because a majority of the participants come from the 5Cs. This is due to 5C students and 
graduates being indoctrinated with the same progressive beliefs. Furthermore, because Scripps 
College is one of the Claremont Colleges, which places an emphasis on women rights, equity, 
and feminism, students are more conscious of women issues. Additionally, the Senator who 
enacted the Bill is a Scripps alumna; so, participants could have heard of the Bill through 
publicity about this.  
While a majority of the participant pool are from the Claremont Colleges, or have been 
referred by someone at the Claremont Colleges, is a limitation, it can be indicative of the 
knowledge of California professionals. Because these participants are more likely to be aware of 
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this Bill and these issues, we can assume that these beliefs are representative of those at one side 
of the spectrum (strongly supporting feminist values of pro-choice, equal pay, and equal 
representation). Therefore, through learning that only 40% of participants were aware of the Bill, 
this is indicative that more discussion about the Bill needs to occur. So, companies can be 
influenced to change their boards.  
Empirical Analysis 
 When collecting data, I had to manually label NAICS codes tech vs. not-tech based on 
my definition that tech firms are reliant on technology to create their main product or platform; 
however, these companies are not aerospace or telecommunication firms. Because I crafted this 
definition, these results are limited. If someone else interpreted tech companies to reflect other 
firms, my results could potentially not align with theirs. Additionally, because I focused labeling 
on NAICS codes as opposed to companies, some companies, which brand themselves as tech, 
were left out of the analysis. For example, Fitbit, a fitness technology hardware company, was 
not in this study because their NAICS code is 334519 or Other Measuring and Controlling 
Device Manufacturing, which did not fit into my definition of technology (NAICS, 2020).  
To expand upon the research, I could have further researched differences in gender of the 
Chairman of the Boards and total board gender composition, as most people appoint candidates 
who are more similar than different to them (Rivera, 2012; Karimi et al., 2018). I could have also 
taken into account accounting measures of performance like Tobin’s Q, Return on Assets, or 
Return on Equity to analyze if there was indication on direct revenue rather than the reaction of 
the stock market.  
To receive better results, I could have also collected data that would allow me to control 
for specific company characteristics, such as, firm information. For example, I could have 
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controlled for number of employees, firm size, and number of competitors. I could have also run 
a multiple regression and taken into consideration the effects of firm employee information, such 
as, CEO tenure, CEO gender, critical mass,30 percentage of employee stockholders, and board 
members’ race, ethnicities, and ages (Bohren & Storm, 2010; Torchia et al., 2011). Through 
controlling for these characteristics and adding more variables to my regression, the relationship 
between stock prices and percentage of female managers could have been more clearly identified 
and supported.    
CONCLUSION 
In my research, I intended to fill the missing gap that was not present in literature 
surrounding women on boards, by including employees’ perspectives, as well as, focusing on a 
specific industry, tech. Through my results, I have understood that employees at companies who 
were in compliance with the Bill were more likely to know about the Bill (Interview Hypothesis 
1). Additionally, participants believed C-Suite quota legislation could be more effective in 
impacting gender-diversity (Interview Hypothesis 3). Lastly, I discovered that the fine was not 
an incentivizing factor for companies to comply with the Bill (Interview Hypothesis 4). 
 Through my empirical analysis, I learned women on boards and stock price returns were 
not statistically significant relationship and had weak correlations (Dataset 3, 4; Empirical 
Analysis Hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 4). Despite having no impact on market performance, as we 
discovered through conversations with employees, they believed that the Bill was “fair and 
effective.” In fact, they believed that structural change has significant power to create more 
equity on corporate boards. These results were different than the public reactions that have been 
 
30 Torchia et. al (2011) analyzed the impact that ‘minorities,’ one, two, or three women, have on firm innovation. 
Critical mass theory suggests that the “nature of group interactions depends upon size,” meaning that significant 
change takes place in group interactions (p. 302). 
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popularized through the media stating that the Bill may lead to women feeling tokenized and that 
it is unconstitutional (Judicial Watch, 2019; Symon, 2019; Sulek, 2018). In fact, none of these 
participants had experienced tokenism at their current workplaces.   
While there is no statistically significant relationship between stock price performance 
and women on boards, powerful arguments still remain for diversifying boards. Researchers have 
found that women on boards impacts the company internally by increasing firm knowledge, 
board attendance and female retention rates, and externally, to the public and investors through 
participating in charity and Corporate Social Responsibility (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Billimoria, 2006; Kim & Starks, 2016; Williams, 2003; Bear et al., 2010; Sealy, 2008). Beyond 
effects directly linked to firms, diversity is also important for attracting talent, as 67% of job 
seekers said a diverse workforce was important when considering job offers (Hunt et al., 2018; 
Glassdoor, 2014). Lastly, a lack of relationship between stock price performance and women on 
boards needs to be observed warily, as women experience the Glass Cliff Effect, or being 
appointed to leadership during times of crisis (Ryan & Haslam, 2005). Additionally, Solal and 
Snellman (2019) found that not only companies’ market values decreased when adding women 
on boards, but also found that when firms made clear commitments to diversity initiatives, there 
was a greater decline in firm value. Therefore, the market is not necessarily “motivated by a 
genuine preference for diversity” (p. 1283). 
Overall, this research sheds light on the possibilities for future studies. For example, it 
would be interesting to compare the relationship between a firm’s accounting financial 
performance versus market performance indicators. One could also analyze companies over the 
period of a recession or bankruptcy to observe if there is a positive relationship between 
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percentage of women on boards and market performance to better understand the impacts of the 
Glass Cliff Effect. 
The California Senate Bill 826 was passed in September 2018 and companies have until 
the end of December 2021 to comply with the Bill. Moving forward, within the next year, it will 
be fascinating to observe a myriad of reactions. How many companies will end up complying 
with the Bill? If companies do not comply with the Bill, will they receive negative press? Will 
the Bill be declared unconstitutional? What effects of adding more women on boards have on 
increasing parity within the workforce? Outside of the effects on California companies, will CA 
SB 826 and its results lead other companies, beyond Illinois, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and 
Washington, to enact similar legislature? Ultimately, I am curious to observe the impacts this 
Bill ends up having on companies state-wide and nationally. I feel fortunate to have been a part 
of extending the research on this contemporary topic by providing further insights and reasoning 
as to why more women need to be included in board-level corporate conversations. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Companies by Single Identifying North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) 
NAICS 
ID 
NAICS Name Ticker Company Name 
334118 
Computer Terminal and Other Computer 
Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 
ANET ARISTA NETWORKS INC 
IMMR IMMERSION CORP 
LOGI LOGITECH INTERNATIONAL SA 
SCKT SOCKET MOBILE INC 
334418 
Printed Circuit Assembly (Electronic 
Assembly) Manufacturing 
TTMI TTM TECHNOLOGIES INC 
334419 Other Electronic Component Manufacturing 
GOOGL / GOOG ALPHABET INC 
HEAR TURTLE BEACH CORP 
334513 
Instruments and Related Products 
Manufacturing for Measuring, 
Displaying, and Controlling Industrial 
Process Variables 
FLDM FLUIDIGM CORP 
UCTT ULTRA CLEAN HOLDINGS INC 
334614 
Software and Other Prerecorded Compact 
Disc, Tape, and Record Reproducing 
ZNGA ZYNGA INC 
423710 Hardware Merchant Wholesalers GPRO GOPRO INC 
511210 
Software Publishers 
 
ADBE 
ADOBE INC / ADOBE SYSTEMS 
INC 
ADSK AUTODESK INC 
APPF APPFOLIO INC 
BVSN BROADVISION INC 
CAMP CALAMP CORP 
CRM SALESFORCE COM INC 
CSOD CORNERSTONE ONDEMAND INC 
DBX DROPBOX INC 
DOCU DOCUSIGN INC 
EA ELECTRONIC ARTS INC 
FIVN FIVE 9 INC 
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INVE 
IDENTIVE GROUP INC / IDETIVE 
INC / S C M MICROSYSTEMS INC 
MOBL MOBILEIRON INC 
NLOK NORTONLIFELOCK INC 
NVDA NVIDIA CORP 
ORCL ORACLE CORP 
PVTL PIVOTAL SOFTWARE INC 
QADA QAD INC 
QLYS QUALYS INC 
SNAP SNAP INC 
SPLK SPLUNK INC 
SQ SQUARE INC 
TWLO TWILIO INC 
VEEV VEEVA SYSTEMS INC 
WDAY WORKDAY INC 
ZEN ZENDESK INC 
ZUO ZUORA INC 
518210 
Data Processing, Hosting, and Related 
Services 
ISDR ISSUER DIRECT CORP 
JNPR JUNIPER NETWORKS INC 
LEAF/LFGR LEAF GROUP LTD 
OOMA OOMA INC 
VERI VERITONE INC 
519190 All Other Information Services 
BOX BOX INC 
GOOGL ALPHABET INC / GOOGLE INC 
JCOM J2 GLOBAL INC 
TWTR TWITTER INC 
YELP YELP INC 
541511 Custom Computer Programming Services 
CLDR CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC 
CSLT CLOUDERA INC 
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FSCT 
FORESCOUT TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
OKTA OKTA INC 
541512 Computer Systems Design Services 
AYX ALTERYX INC 
EBAY EBAY INC 
ESTC ELASTIC N V 
FB FACEBOOK INC 
LEAF LEAF GROUP LTD 
NXGN NEXTGEN HEALTHCARE INC 
PLAN ANAPLAN INC 
SNX SYNNEX CORP 
WATT ENERGOUS CORP 
541890 Other Services Related to Advertising QUOT QUOTIENT TECHNOLOGY INC 
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Table 2. Companies by Multiple Identifying NAICS 
NAICS ID NAICS Title Ticker Company Name 
334118 + 541511 
Computer Terminal and Other Computer 
Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 
 
Data Processing, Hosting, and Related 
Services 
FSCT 
FORESCOUT TECHNOLOGIES 
INC 
334118 + 518210 
Computer Terminal and Other Computer 
Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 
 
Data Processing, Hosting, and Related 
Services 
JNPR JUNIPER NETWORKS INC 
334118 + 511210 
Computer Terminal and Other Computer 
Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 
 
Software Publishers 
SQ SQUARE INC 
INVE IDETIVE INC 
334614 + 423710 
Software and Other Prerecorded 
Compact Disc, Tape, and Record 
Reproducing 
 
Hardware Merchant Wholesalers 
ATVI ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC 
334614 + 511210 
Software and Other Prerecorded 
Compact Disc, Tape, and Record 
Reproducing  
 
Software Publishers 
TIVO TIVO INC 
519190 + 511210 Software Publishers BOX BOX INC 
541511 + 511210 
Data Processing, Hosting, and Related 
Services 
 
Software Publishers 
CDNS 
CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS 
INC 
GLUU GLU MOBILE INC 
PFPT PROOFPOINT INC 
541890 + 511210 
Other Services Related to Advertising 
Software Publishers 
COUP COUPA SOFTWARE INC 
541512 + 511210 Software Publishers NOW SERVICENOW INC 
541511 + 541512 
Data Processing, Hosting, and Related 
Services 
 
Computer Systems Design Services 
VMW VMWARE INC 
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Table 3. Variable Definitions 
sp stock price 
pwd percent of women directors 
aisp average stock price 
pcwd percent change of women directors 
pcsp percent change stock price 
pcaisp percent change average industry stock price 
2sdabove 2 standard deviations above average percent 
of women 
pc2sdabove  2 standard deviations above average percent 
change of women 
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DATA 
 
Dataset 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Stock Prices 
Average 
Industry 
Stock Price 
% of 
Women 
Directors 
2 SD Above 
% Women 
Directors 
(Dummy 
Above) 
% ∆* Stock 
Prices 
Average 
Industry % 
∆ Stock 
Price 
% ∆ Women 
Directors 
2 SD Above  
% ∆ Women 
Directors 
(Dummy Above 
Percent 
Change) 
Mean $55.22  $53.82  13.18% 2.86% 6.4% -4.58% 0.22% 0% 
Standard Error $5.59  $0.64  0.56% 0.75% 4.51% 1.82% 1.75% 0% 
Median $23.71  $50.60  12.5% 0% 8.06% 7.99% 0% 0% 
Mode $0.00  $78.85  0% 0% -100% -100% 0% 0% 
Standard Deviation $123.83  $14.09  12.3% 16.68% 99.75% 40.21% 38.72% 0% 
Minimum $0.00  $33.09  0% 0% -100% -100% -100% 0% 
Maximum $1,195.81  $78.85  62.5% 100% 1635.04% 27.94% 300% 0% 
*%∆ means percentage change  
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Dataset 2. Results of Regression Analyses 
 Regression 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Stock Price (Y) 1.130 (0.959) 1.791 (0.935)     
Average Industry Stock Price 0.887 (0.031) 0.985 (0.013)     
% of Women 48.399 (0.303)       
2 SD Above % Women Directors  
(Dummy Above) 
 
 15.243 (0.650)     
% Change Stock Price (Y)  
   0.114 (0.005) 0.116 (0.005) 
Average Industry % ∆ Stock Price    1.099 (0) 1.089 (0) 
% ∆ Women  
   -0.007 (0.952)   
2 SD Above % ∆ Women Directors  
(Dummy Above % ∆) 
  
          -0.102 (0.742) 
NOTE - Variables are x-variables, or independent variables, unless they are Stock Price and % ∆ Stock Price, which are y-variables, or dependent variables as 
indicated by the (Y). Coefficients are in the first columns and p-values are in parentheses. Bolded values in parentheses are statistically significant (p < 0.05). 
 
Multiple R, R Square, Adjusted R Square, Standard Error, Observations, and F-values are as follows:  
Regression 1: 0.123, 0.015, 0.011, 123.14, 490, 3.727.  
Regression 2: 0.116, 0.013, 0.009, 123.25, 490, 3.293.  
Regression 3: 0.442, 0.196, 0.192, 0.896, 490, 59.211.  
Regression 4: 0.442, 0.196, 0.192, 0.896, 490, 59.277 
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CORRELATIONS 
Dataset 3. Correlation for Regression #1 
  Stock Prices Average Industry Stock Price % of Women Directors 
Stock Prices 1   
Average Industry Stock Price 0.114 1  
% of Women Directors 0.075 0.266 1 
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Dataset 4. Correlation for Regression #2 
  
% ∆ Stock Prices 
Average Industry % ∆ Stock 
Price 
% ∆ Women 
Directors 
% ∆ Stock Prices 1   
Average Industry % ∆ Stock Price 0.442 1  
% Change Women 0.125 0.287 1 
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RAW DATA 
Dataset 5. Companies by Stock Prices 
  Stock Prices ($) 
Company Stock 
Ticker 
Percentile 
Backet 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
ADBE 15-20 28.58 30.31 30.21 33.00 47.50 68.25 81.35 98.30 146.80 236.72 284.04 
ADSK 30-35 20.77 30.63 36.90 35.10 39.72 54.28 54.92 62.27 102.81 132.17 160.54 
ANET 30-35      71.24 75.69 163.81 256.21 251.09 
APPF 10-15      15.76 16.42 34.90 58.77 93.44 
ATVI 5-10    11.81 15.55 20.71 27.97 37.95 57.22 68.54 49.69 
AYX 25-30        20.69 43.84 99.04 
BOX 15-20      16.12 12.92 18.92 22.21 18.07 
BVSN 0-5 13.85 12.07 11.36 15.86 9.15 9.47 5.98 5.93 3.68 2.13 1.78 
CAMP 15-20 1.79 2.61 3.42 6.86 16.26 21.51 18.18 15.23 19.42 21.34 11.74 
CDNS 10-15 5.58 7.01 10.10 12.02 13.94 16.85 19.99 24.08 36.17 42.98 65.50 
CLDR 20-25        17.29 15.56 9.71 
COUP 15-20     18.83 11.08 27.25 30.21 57.89 121.06 
CRM 15-20 45.97 97.65 131.30 145.09 78.94 58.03 71.31 74.73 91.16 133.25 156.96 
CSLT 10-15     14.15 6.53 3.98 3.82 3.23 2.40 
CSOD 10-15  16.76 24.36 43.25 41.93 32.93 38.11 38.36 48.27 56.62 
DBX 25-30         27.15 21.68 
DOCU 35-40         48.23 57.56 
EA 15-20 18.89 16.38 20.93 14.29 22.02 35.19 64.35 74.06 105.05 114.87 97.30 
EBAY 15-20 18.66 24.43 31.47 43.22 53.22 54.02 42.76 27.14 35.19 35.30 37.46 
ESTC 10-15          81.87 
FB 25-30    36.75 69.91 88.75 118.89 158.87 168.28 184.60 
FIVN 15-20     6.09 5.10 12.02 21.01 36.22 55.69 
FLDM 5-10   14.70 14.91 22.11 33.72 23.62 7.99 5.26 6.83 8.75 
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FSCT 10-15        27.29 31.45 36.04 
GLUU 15-20 0.91 1.44 3.82 4.13 2.90 4.48 4.81 2.43 2.96 5.89 7.51 
GOOGL 20-25 #### 525.35 573.14 647.00 895.72 867.92 625.91 763.77 945.94 1123.53 1195.81 
GPRO 10-15      41.39 12.04 9.04 5.67 5.15 
HEAR 5-10      7.15 2.20 1.16 0.78 13.58 10.96 
IMMR 10-15 4.17 5.34 7.10 5.74 11.67 10.70 11.42 8.23 8.58 11.69 8.15 
INVE 5-10  1.87 2.38 1.45 0.91 8.20 6.05 2.23 4.70 4.51 5.15 
ISDR 0-5      9.98 6.51 4.95 11.71 12.98 9.42 
JCOM 5-10 21.51 23.80 28.70 28.73 44.03 51.31 70.44 69.08 80.63 79.14 88.15 
JNPR 10-15 22.33 29.17 29.90 18.98 19.76 23.94 26.53 24.59 27.87 27.04 25.66 
LEAF 5-10     22.23 29.53 45.12 6.58 7.77 8.99 6.00 
LOGI 20-25 14.49 16.43 12.37 8.65 8.28 14.14 14.46 19.26 33.97 40.00 40.17 
MOBL 5-10      10.08 5.80 3.54 4.43 4.74 5.78 
NLOK 20-25          25.21 
NOW 15-20   30.67 43.39 61.15 77.49 71.67 107.84 175.32 259.97 
NVDA 5-10 12.12 13.27 17.08 13.47 14.30 18.66 23.90 56.88 152.05 228.97 176.80 
NXGN 5-10          16.89 17.30 
OKTA 20-25        26.20 52.08 108.40 
OOMA 20-25      8.03 7.84 10.03 13.42 12.88 
ORCL 15-20 20.28 25.28 31.55 30.17 33.65 40.58 40.31 39.47 46.97 47.92 53.83 
PFPT 15-20   13.61 24.16 38.48 61.06 65.39 84.75 106.98 118.09 
PLAN 0-5          25.85 46.12 
PVTL 25-30         20.58 16.66 
QADA 10-15 9.10 10.53 13.19 13.69 20.19 23.87 22.08 32.59 47.33 44.93 
QLYS 25-30   13.83 17.04 27.52 38.54 30.71 45.05 78.29 84.73 
QUOT 20-25      6.43 11.22 12.25 13.25 9.59 
SCKT 0-5 2.96 2.21 2.15 2.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.19 3.94 2.55 2.11 
SNAP 15-20        17.05 11.34 13.33 
SNX 10-15 24.62 27.58 30.74 35.18 48.49 66.69 81.05 100.03 121.73 98.80 103.99 
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SPLK 15-20   31.38 50.99 61.79 61.95 54.24 65.67 104.84 128.92 
SQ 25-30      12.57 11.64 25.52 63.42 69.34 
TIVO 0-5 8.97 10.26 9.83 10.30 12.35 12.77 9.87 13.11 18.47 12.76 8.46 
TTMI 5-10 8.69 10.56 14.25 10.22 8.59 7.64 8.15 9.45 16.02 15.24 11.73 
TWLO 30-35       41.71 28.87 61.22 120.44 
TWTR 20-25    52.61 45.34 34.19 17.49 18.01 32.15 35.63 
UCTT 20-25 3.46 8.65 8.19 6.19 7.16 9.80 6.51 6.85 20.90 15.13 14.98 
VEEV 0-5     37.17 27.53 27.18 34.52 55.99 82.97 143.39 
VERI 5-10         22.20 13.00 5.27 
VMW 15-20 31.67 68.87 91.37 95.39 77.89 93.82 77.55 65.11 101.95 141.19 165.28 
WATT 5-10      11.76 8.13 12.83 13.68 13.88 4.23 
WDAY 15-20   51.03 68.62 87.81 80.14 76.89 97.22 135.99 186.72 
YELP 20-25   22.01 42.93 69.84 35.97 29.91 37.77 41.72 35.04 
ZEN 50-55      22.76 24.58 28.83 54.65 79.63 
ZNGA 20-25   6.04 3.34 3.40 2.57 2.59 3.43 3.81 5.80 
ZUO 10-15         22.38 17.21 
Average Stock Prices 35.46 41.68 45.39 42.83 51.59 50.34 42.77 45.56 58.19 71.26 80.83 
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Dataset 6. Companies by Percentage Change (% ∆) Stock Prices 
  Percent Change (% ∆) Stock Prices 
Company Stock 
Ticker 
Percentile 
Backet 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
ADBE 15-20 
6% 0% 9% 44% 44% 19% 21% 49% 61% 20% 
-
100% 
ADSK 30-35 
47% 20% -5% 13% 37% 1% 13% 65% 29% 21% 
-
100% 
ANET 30-35             6% 116% 56% -2% 
APPF 10-15             4% 113% 68% 59% 
ATVI 5-10 
      32% 33% 35% 36% 51% 20% -28% 
-
100% 
AYX 25-30                 112% 126% 
BOX 15-20             -20% 46% 17% -19% 
BVSN 0-5 
-13% -6% 40% -42% 4% -37% -1% -38% -42% -16% 
-
100% 
CAMP 15-20 
45% 31% 101% 137% 32% -15% -16% 28% 10% -45% 
-
100% 
CDNS 10-15 
26% 44% 19% 16% 21% 19% 20% 50% 19% 52% 
-
100% 
CLDR 20-25                 -10% -38% 
COUP 15-20           -41% 146% 11% 92% 109% 
CRM 15-20 
112% 34% 10% -46% -26% 23% 5% 22% 46% 18% 
-
100% 
CSLT 10-15           -54% -39% -4% -15% -26% 
CSOD 10-15     45% 78% -3% -21% 16% 1% 26% 17% 
DBX 25-30                   -20% 
DOCU 35-40                   19% 
EA 15-20 
-13% 28% -32% 54% 60% 83% 15% 42% 9% -15% 
-
100% 
EBAY 15-20 
31% 29% 37% 23% 2% -21% -37% 30% 0% 6% 
-
100% 
ESTC 10-15                     
FB 25-30         90% 27% 34% 34% 6% 10% 
FIVN 15-20           -16% 136% 75% 72% 54% 
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FLDM 5-10 
    1% 48% 53% -30% -66% -34% 30% 28% 
-
100% 
FSCT 10-15                 15% 15% 
GLUU 15-20 
58% 164% 8% -30% 55% 8% -50% 22% 99% 28% 
-
100% 
GOOGL 20-25 
17% 9% 13% 38% -3% -28% 22% 24% 19% 6% 
-
100% 
GPRO 10-15             -71% -25% -37% -9% 
HEAR 5-10 
          -69% -47% -32% 1635% -19% 
-
100% 
IMMR 10-15 
28% 33% -19% 104% -8% 7% -28% 4% 36% -30% 
-
100% 
INVE 5-10 
  27% -39% -37% 800% -26% -63% 111% -4% 14% 
-
100% 
ISDR 0-5 
          -35% -24% 137% 11% -27% 
-
100% 
JCOM 5-10 
11% 21% 0% 53% 17% 37% -2% 17% -2% 11% 
-
100% 
JNPR 10-15 
31% 3% -37% 4% 21% 11% -7% 13% -3% -5% 
-
100% 
LEAF 5-10 
        33% 53% -85% 18% 16% -33% 
-
100% 
LOGI 20-25 
13% -25% -30% -4% 71% 2% 33% 76% 18% 0% 
-
100% 
MOBL 5-10 
          -42% -39% 25% 7% 22% 
-
100% 
NLOK 20-25                     
NOW 15-20       41% 41% 27% -8% 50% 63% 48% 
NVDA 5-10 
9% 29% -21% 6% 31% 28% 138% 167% 51% -23% 
-
100% 
NXGN 5-10 
                  2% 
-
100% 
OKTA 20-25                 99% 108% 
OOMA 20-25             -2% 28% 34% -4% 
ORCL 15-20 
25% 25% -4% 12% 21% -1% -2% 19% 2% 12% 
-
100% 
PFPT 15-20       78% 59% 59% 7% 30% 26% 10% 
PLAN 0-5 
                  78% 
-
100% 
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PVTL 25-30                   -19% 
QADA 10-15   16% 25% 4% 47% 18% -8% 48% 45% -5% 
QLYS 25-30       23% 62% 40% -20% 47% 74% 8% 
QUOT 20-25             74% 9% 8% -28% 
SCKT 0-5 
-25% -3% 7% -100% 0% 0% 0% 24% -35% -17% 
-
100% 
SNAP 15-20                 -34% 18% 
SNX 10-15 
12% 11% 14% 38% 38% 22% 23% 22% -19% 5% 
-
100% 
SPLK 15-20       63% 21% 0% -12% 21% 60% 23% 
SQ 25-30             -7% 119% 149% 9% 
TIVO 0-5 
14% -4% 5% 20% 3% -23% 33% 41% -31% -34% 
-
100% 
TTMI 5-10 
21% 35% -28% -16% -11% 7% 16% 70% -5% -23% 
-
100% 
TWLO 30-35               -31% 112% 97% 
TWTR 20-25         -14% -25% -49% 3% 79% 11% 
UCTT 20-25 
150% -5% -24% 16% 37% -34% 5% 205% -28% -1% 
-
100% 
VEEV 0-5 
        -26% -1% 27% 62% 48% 73% 
-
100% 
VERI 5-10 
                -41% -59% 
-
100% 
VMW 15-20 
117% 33% 4% -18% 20% -17% -16% 57% 38% 17% 
-
100% 
WATT 5-10 
          -31% 58% 7% 1% -70% 
-
100% 
WDAY 15-20       34% 28% -9% -4% 26% 40% 37% 
YELP 20-25       95% 63% -48% -17% 26% 10% -16% 
ZEN 50-55             8% 17% 90% 46% 
ZNGA 20-25       -45% 2% -24% 0% 33% 11% 52% 
ZUO 10-15                   -23% 
Average % ∆  
of Stock Prices  
32.89% 22.86% 3.85% 21.61% 46.07% -2.77% 2.97% 39.73% 54.36% 9.67% -100% 
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Dataset 7. Companies by Percentage (%) of Female Directors 
   Percentage (%) of Female Directors 
Company Stock 
Ticker  
Percentile 
Backet 
Dummy 
Above 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
ADBE 15-20 0 14% 11% 0% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 20% 11% 18% 
ADSK 30-35 1 13% 13% 13% 38% 38% 44% 44% 33% 40% 56% 56% 
ANET 30-35 1       43% 29% 29% 29% 29% 
APPF 10-15 0        14% 14% 14% 14% 
ATVI 5-10 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 13% 11% 11% 20% 20% 
AYX 25-30 0          25% 25% 
BOX 15-20 0       20% 11% 11% 13% 33% 
BVSN 0-5 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CAMP 15-20 0 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 33% 17% 17% 17% 17% 29% 
CDNS 10-15 0 0% 0% 0% 13% 14% 14% 13% 13% 13% 25% 25% 
CLDR 20-25 0          25% 22% 
COUP 15-20 0         13% 17% 17% 
CRM 15-20 0 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 18% 18% 25% 25% 23% 
CSLT 10-15 0       17% 17% 13% 0% 11% 
CSOD 10-15 0    0% 0% 0% 17% 14% 17% 11% 20% 
DBX 25-30 0           25% 
DOCU 35-40 0           36% 
EA 15-20 0 20% 20% 18% 18% 0% 0% 11% 11% 20% 27% 22% 
EBAY 15-20 0 9% 9% 9% 9% 10% 10% 15% 20% 18% 31% 33% 
ESTC 10-15 0           14% 
FB 25-30 0     14% 29% 25% 29% 29% 29% 25% 
FIVN 15-20 0       13% 13% 14% 17% 17% 
FLDM 5-10 0   0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 
FSCT 10-15 0          11% 11% 
GLUU 15-20 0 25% 25% 25% 14% 14% 14% 14% 11% 13% 22% 22% 
GOOGL 20-25 0        27% 25% 25% 18% 
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GPRO 10-15 0       0% 0% 13% 22% 22% 
HEAR 5-10 0  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 17% 0% 0% 0% 
IMMR 10-15 0 25% 17% 17% 17% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 17% 17% 
INVE 5-10 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 25% 33% 0% 0% 
ISDR 0-5 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
JCOM 5-10 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 13% 
JNPR 10-15 0 17% 11% 10% 20% 20% 18% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% 
LEAF 5-10 0   0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 13% 22% 
LOGI 20-25 0 20% 20% 20% 20% 22% 25% 22% 22% 22% 33% 27% 
MOBL 5-10 0       0% 0% 0% 14% 20% 
NLOK 20-25 0 10% 9% 9% 10% 13% 33% 33% 33% 33% 23% 18% 
NOW 15-20 0     0% 0% 20% 22% 20% 22% 22% 
NVDA 5-10 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 17% 17% 17% 0% 9% 
NXGN 5-10 0 0% 0% 11% 11% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 11% 11% 
OKTA 20-25 0          14% 25% 
OOMA 20-25 0        13% 25% 29% 29% 
ORCL 15-20 0 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 18% 23% 23% 
PFPT 15-20 0     14% 29% 33% 17% 17% 25% 0% 
PLAN 0-5 0           0% 
PVTL 25-30 0           25% 
QADA 10-15 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 20% 20% 20% 33% 
QLYS 25-30 1     14% 29% 29% 22% 22% 25% 43% 
QUOT 20-25 0       25% 20% 17% 17% 22% 
SCKT 0-5 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
SNAP 15-20 0          11% 20% 
SNX 10-15 0 0% 0% 13% 13% 9% 10% 10% 10% 10% 18% 18% 
SPLK 15-20 0     0% 13% 20% 22% 22% 22% 20% 
SQ 25-30 0        25% 25% 27% 30% 
TIVO 0-5 0         0% 0% 0% 
TTMI 5-10 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 20% 
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TWLO 30-35 1         29% 29% 43% 
TWTR 20-25 0      13% 13% 13% 22% 38% 30% 
UCTT 20-25 0 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 33% 25% 25% 25% 
VEEV 0-5 0      0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
VERI 5-10 0          0% 13% 
VMW 15-20 1 13% 13% 13% 13% 50% 11% 13% 0% 13% 13% 13% 
WATT 5-10 0      0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% 
WDAY 15-20 0     17% 17% 20% 17% 13% 13% 11% 
YELP 20-25 0     11% 22% 22% 25% 25% 25% 25% 
ZEN 50-55 1       57% 57% 57% 63% 56% 
ZNGA 20-25 0    0% 13% 11% 25% 25% 30% 38% 38% 
ZUO 10-15 0           14% 
Average % of 
Female 
Directors  
 
9% 8% 8% 9% 9% 11% 15% 15% 16% 18% 20% 
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Dataset 8. Companies by Percentage Change (% ∆) of Female Directors 
  Percentage Change (% ∆) of Female Directors 
Stock Prices 
Dummy 
Above %∆ 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
ADBE 0 -22% -100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -13% -44% 64% -100% 
ADSK 0 0% 0% 200% 0% 19% 0% -25% 20% 39% 0% -100% 
ANET 0             0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
APPF 0             0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
ATVI 0       0% 0% 0% -11% 0% 80% 0% -100% 
AYX 0                 0% 0% 0% 
BOX 0             -44% 0% 13% 167% 0% 
BVSN 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
CAMP 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% -50% 0% 0% 0% 71% -100% 
CDNS 0 0% 0% 0% 14% 0% -13% 0% 0% 100% 0% -100% 
CLDR 0                 0% -11% 0% 
COUP 0           0% 0% 0% 33% 0% 0% 
CRM 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 82% 0% 38% 0% -8% -100% 
CSLT 1           0% 0% -25% -100% 0% 0% 
CSOD 0     0% 0% 0% 0% -14% 17% -33% 80% 0% 
DBX 0                   0% 0% 
DOCU 0                   0% 0% 
EA 0 0% -9% 0% -100% 0% 0% 0% 80% 36% -19% -100% 
EBAY 0 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 54% 30% -9% 69% 8% -100% 
ESTC 0                     0% 
FB 0         100% -13% 14% 0% 0% -13% 0% 
FIVN 0           0% 0% 14% 17% 0% 0% 
FLDM 0     0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
FSCT 0                 0% 0% 0% 
GLUU 0 0% 0% -43% 0% 0% 0% -22% 13% 78% 0% -100% 
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GOOGL 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -8% 0% -27% 0% 
GPRO 0             0% 0% 78% 0% 0% 
HEAR 0           0% 0% -100% 0% 0% 0% 
IMMR 0 -33% 0% 0% -100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% -100% 
INVE 0   0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% -100% 0% 0% 
ISDR 0           0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
JCOM 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% -13% -100% 
JNPR 0 -33% -10% 100% 0% -9% 10% -50% 0% -100% 0% 0% 
LEAF 0         0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 78% 0% 
LOGI 0 0% 0% 0% 11% 13% -11% 0% 0% 50% -18% -100% 
MOBL 0           0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 0% 
NLOK 0                     -100% 
NOW 0       0% 0% 0% 11% -10% 11% 0% 0% 
NVDA 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 67% 0% 0% -100% 0% 0% 
NXGN 0                   0% -100% 
OKTA 0                 0% 75% 0% 
OOMA 0             0% 100% 14% 0% 0% 
ORCL 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% 27% 0% -100% 
PFPT 0       0% 100% 17% -50% 0% 50% -100% 0% 
PLAN 0                   0% 0% 
PVTL 0                   0% 0% 
QADA 0   0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 67% -100% 
QLYS 0       0% 100% 0% -22% 0% 13% 71% 0% 
QUOT 0             -20% -17% 0% 33% 0% 
SCKT 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
SNAP 0                 0% 80% 0% 
SNX 0 0% 0% 0% -27% 10% 0% 0% 0% 82% 0% -100% 
SPLK 0       0% 0% 60% 11% 0% 0% -10% 0% 
SQ 0             0% 0% 9% 10% 0% 
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TIVO 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
TTMI 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% -100% 
TWLO 0               0% 0% 50% 0% 
TWTR 0         0% 0% 0% 78% 69% -20% 0% 
UCTT 0 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 67% -25% 0% 0% -100% 
VEEV 0         0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
VERI 0                 0% 0% 0% 
VMW 0 0% 0% 0% 300% -78% 13% -100% 0% 0% 0% -100% 
WATT 0           0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
WDAY 0       0% 0% 20% -17% -25% 0% -11% 0% 
YELP 0       0% 100% 0% 13% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
ZEN 0             0% 0% 9% -11% 0% 
ZNGA 0       0% -11% 125% 0% 20% 25% 0% 0% 
ZUO 0                   0% 0% 
 
Average Industry  
% ∆ Stock Prices 
-4.04% -4.96% 9.89% 3.18% 11.66% 8.01% -4.34% 3.50% 7.55% 11.13% -29% 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1. Interview Consent Form 
 
Interview Consent Form 
Project Title: Understanding CA SB 826’s Impact 
Principal Investigator: Kimi Kaneshina 
Email: kimberlykaneshina@gmail.com 
 
Introduction: I’ll be conducting research about the effects of CA Senate Bill 826 on companies within 
the Valley. This Bill was passed in 2018 by a Scripps alumna, Senator Hannah Beth Jackson. It requires 
public and headquartered CA companies to incorporate a quota for women on corporate boards. You can 
read about the Bill here. Throughout my research, thus far, I’ve found that there’s research supporting the 
Bill through an economical lens—how do more woman on corporate boards better impact the company’s 
bottom line, stock price, etc. There’s also research from a more academic approach—is women being 
more represented on corporate boards a civil right? Yet, there’s a missing piece—what is it like for the 
people at these companies that are being impacted by the Bill? Is the Bill discussed in their respective 
workplaces? Are employees aware that decisions are made in, or against, compliance with the Bill? These 
are the questions I intend on answering through my interviews.  
 
Qualifications: You are being asked to participate because you are over 18 years and work at a company 
which will be impacted by this Bill. 
 
Description of study: To create a comprehensive thesis, I’ll be doing a three-part analysis. I will analyze 
economic factors and their relationship with the Bill, provide case studies of other countries that have 
enacted similar bills, and interviews employees at companies, which will be impacted by the Bill.  
 
Time/Description: I’ll be doing an informational interview with you. I’ll be asking a series of questions 
about your company’s reaction to the Bill, your team’s reaction to the Bill, your awareness of the Bill and 
how it’s impacting your company, etc. It should take no longer than 30 minutes. I will be recording the 
interview and taking notes, so I can refer back to your statements when I’m coding the interviews.  
 
 
Please sign here if you consent to your interview being recorded: 
 
 
___________________________ ____________________________      ____________ 
Signature of Research Participant        Printed Name            Date  
 
 
Risks: In the Spring, my thesis will be uploaded to Scholarship@Claremont, the Claremont College’s 
platform for research and theses. If you give information that is a confidentiality breach of corporate 
information, it could put you at risk of unemployment.  
 
Benefits: None 
 
Statement of participation: Participation is completely voluntary. If you feel uncomfortable or wish to 
not answer a question or stop the interview, at any time, please let me know.  
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Description of data: If consented above, audio will be recorded. Additionally, hand-written and typed 
notes will be taken during the interviews. This information will be stored in a password-protected folder.  
 
Private information: I will be using the information below to code your interview and will collate the 
data. For example, after collecting through the data, I may perform a linear regression to understand if 
there’s a relationship between awareness levels of the Bill and participants’ genders. I also may use 
quotations to better support my findings. For example, if there was a positive correlation between 
awareness levels and gender, I could supplement that with a participants’ statement who expressed that 
she only had these conversations with female coworkers.  
 
 
Check below if you consent with this information to be used. If checked, fill out the information on 
the right. 
☐ Company Name         _______________________ 
            Company Name  
☐ Position at company        ________________________ 
            Position at company 
☐ Years at company         ______ 
            Years at company   
       ☐ Gender          ______ 
            Gender 
      ☐ Age           ______ 
            Age 
      ☐ Race/Ethnicity         ________________________ 
            Race/Ethnicity 
 
Please sign here to confirm that you consent with the above checked, or unchecked, boxes. 
 
 
___________________________ ____________________________      ____________ 
Signature of Research Participant            Printed Name            Date  
 
 
 
Contact Information: If you have any questions about the thesis, you can contact my major advisor, 
Barbara Junisbai at: Barbara.junisbai@pitzer.edu. You can also contact the Scripps IRB faculty at: 
irb@scrippscollege.edu   
 
 
By signing below, you are indicating that you comply with your answers being used for my thesis 
research.   
 
___________________________ ____________________________      ____________ 
Signature of Research Participant  Printed Name    Date 
 
___________________________ ____________________________      ____________ 
Signature of Researcher   Printed Name    Date 
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Appendix 2. Interview Questions 
Knowledge of the Bill 
1. Have you heard of CA Senate Bill 826? 
a. Yes: What are your opinions about the Bill? Do u think it’s fair? 
b.  No: CA SB 826 was passed in 2018. It requires companies that are headquartered 
and public within California to add women to their corporate boards. If there’s 5 
board members, 3 are required. If there’s 4, 2 are required. And if there’s 3, 1 is 
required. If companies don’t comply with this Bill, they can be fined up to 
300,000. 
 
2. Have people at your workplace talked about the Bill? What are their general impressions 
of the Bill? 
a. Yes: Is this (discussing current events and politics) common in your workplace 
culture? 
b. No: Do employees at your company generally discuss current events and politics?  
 
Company’s Board of Directors  
3. How many board members are on your board? 
 
4. Do employees at your company talk about the board?  
 
5. What’s the relationship of an average employee with the board like?  
 
6. How much of a role does your board play in decision making?  
 
7. Are you aware of the process in which they’re elected? 
a. Yes: Would you mind giving me a high-level overview of it? Also how are 
employees promoted at your company?  
b. No: In general, how are employees promoted at your company?  
 
8. Has there been downward-level (from board to employees) discussion about this bill? 
 
Opinions about the Bill 
9. Do you think a bill that focuses on increasing women within C-suites would be more 
effective in impacting the company’s diversity? Why/why not? 
 
10. Do you think your company would comply with the Bill’s quota if it wasn’t mandatory 
but instead, voluntary? Why/why not? 
 
11. Do you think the fine is an incentivizing factor in motivating these companies?  
 
12. How much influence (1-10) (1 = least, 10 = most) does press play into decision making at 
your company?  
 
13. What is the likelihood of your company complying with the Bill?  
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Gender Diversity & Personal Experiences 
14. Your company currently has a gender breakdown of __% men and __% women. How is 
gender diversity prioritized at your company? Are there any women employee resource 
groups or women related initiatives?  
 
15. Some people feel that the Bill can lead to perpetuating tokenism. Tokenism is the policy 
or practice of making only a symbolic effort, instead of making genuine efforts. Have you 
ever felt tokenized by other coworkers or your company because of your gender or 
another part of your identity?  
 
 
 
 
 
